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SOVIET YOUTH INDOCTRINATION

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by

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SOVIET YOUTH INDOCTRINATION

ABSTRACT

by

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Soviet indoctrination is undertaken to create communistic morality as defined by the Soviet Communist Party. Youth indoctrination is critical. Attitudes instilled at an early age are practiced more naturally than ones imposed in adulthood. The generally consistent line, influenced by various cultural and ideological factors, is one of militaristic patriotism. Effects of such a long-term theme are difficult to reverse quickly. Indeed, the growth of Soviet global strength combines uncomfortably with such indoctrination. Any future modification of Party dominance may prove to be of less moment than the Party's legacy. However, human demands and weaknesses frustrate indoctrination program goals.

*The content of this paper is solely the responsibility of the author. This paper does not represent in any way official policy of the Department of Defense or of the United States Air Force.

PREFACE

In 1970 the national Soviet youth organization, the Komsomol, held a congress or convention during which the delegates received the current Party line and reviewed past Komsomol activities.

Five thousand delegates aged 25-35 attended, representing the millions of youth in this mammoth organization, which includes 27 million card-carrying communist party members. A number of the delegates were dressed in army uniforms. There were no "hippies" to be seen, no beards, no long hair.

At the opening session of the Congress Party Secretary Brezhnev spoke. He compared the unrest of the youth in the West with the calm in the Soviet Union. He spoke of deepening social crises in the West. "Soviet youth," he contrasted, "are growing up morally-healthy, energetic and ambitious . . . full of energy and enthusiasm for the fight for the cause of the Party, for the cause of Communism."¹

By being elected, the delegates showed that they were the most politically active of their peers. While they were waiting for the meeting to start, they shouted in rhythm, "Glory to the Party!" and "Lenin is with us!"²

Contrasted to the troubled youth scene in the West and given that the above scene is basically indicative of Soviet youth attitudes, there would seem to be an enormous behavioral gap between the two.

In the United States the amount of money paid each year for school books and the results of vandalism in schools is the same--\$500 million.³ In Britain extortion among youth is so widespread that even six year olds are running extortion rackets.⁴ In Tokyo groups of youth, though

reportedly sober, "release energy" by racing through busy streets on motorcycles at speeds up to 100 miles per hour.⁵

At the same time that youth crime and unrest are growing in the West, various educators and social workers insist that more permissiveness and less discipline are the answers to the problem. One school superintendent in the United States ruled out coloring books because he said that coloring within printed lines teaches conformity. A school board voted to provide electronic calculators to junior high students with deficiencies in the performance of mathematics problems.⁶ Also in the United States, students rights are being proposed to include the right to sue parents and to leave school.⁷ In North Carolina a school board listened to students' views favoring a controversial textbook and subsequently overruled the objections of their parents.⁸

Albert Bandura wrote that social practices should be evaluated in terms of the effects that they have on the objects of such practices rather than in terms of the humanitarian intent of the practitioners.⁹ The effects in our society are quite visible and easy to research. The West is today the most technically advanced social composite on earth. Yet, we see this society degenerating. There seems to be a relationship between the amount of social experimenting and the level of social degeneracy. A well-known university in Utah practices traditional forms of social discipline and guidance. The students there are spirited, highly educated and motivated along with their generally moderate behavior.¹⁰

The purpose of this paper is to examine "intents and effects" of social manipulation in the Soviet Union as it applies to their youth. The reader may contrast for himself the situation in the West as various problems in the Soviet system are presented below.

It is hoped that the intentions of the Soviet leaders, as manifested by the emphases in their social programs, should be somewhat discernible. The effects or results of these programs are somewhat difficult to measure accurately, due to a paucity of first-hand information. Some of the observations made below on the effects of policies are based on interpretation of social deviation and other reported social acts. One writer warns, however, that, "Under conditions of highly imperfect information, interpretation of Soviet behavior risks an over-zealous attempt to assign specific and individual motives to each Soviet act that catches our attention or provokes our concern."¹¹ However, researching valid and useful Soviet material is not as difficult as it has been in the past and thus perhaps the validity of interpretations may be enhanced. Indigenous survey research is coming of age in the Soviet Union. The quality and quantity is improving.¹²

Most of the material for this paper has been drawn from current periodicals. Reliance on textbooks has been at a minimum and done only when general theoretical or introductory material was needed as a supplement to the core theme herein.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
PREFACE	ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	v
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION.	1
CHAPTER II. DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET POLICY.	5
CHAPTER III. THE NEED FOR INSTITUTIONS	17
CHAPTER IV. YOUTH INDOCTRINATION TODAY.	29
CHAPTER V. POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF SOVIET INDOCTRINATION	47
CHAPTER VI. DETENTE VERSUS MILITARISTIC INDOCTRINATION - "WHICH WILL PREVAIL?"	60
NOTES	70
BIBLIOGRAPHY.	92

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Soviet Union is a closed society which is ruled according to authoritarian principles by a powerful group of elitists.

The totalitarian or total control that these rulers have over their people is used to promote carefully planned and centrally directed policies of various kinds. One of the most significant of these policies is that which concerns their youth.

The leaders of the Soviet Union claim to be followers of Marxist-Leninism and that they are creating the conditions there for a "Communist" society. This goal, they admit, will only be achieved in the distant future and is effected by the political status of the rest of the world. They claim, reasonably enough, that years of infusion of non-Communist socioeconomic systems such as feudalism, capitalism, and socialism have left a deep impression on man's way of thinking. Thus, they must erase these outmoded thoughts and reeducate their populace or educate "correctly" those who do not have an established point of view.

The process of socialist education or reeducation is a pervasive one which is manifest in slogans, movies, books, policies, art, and even physical structures such as buildings and cities. This manifestation is said to reflect "socialist content."

The word chosen here to best describe this process of education is "indoctrination," which is defined in Webster's dictionary as "something which can be smuggled in . . . in the name of democratic education."¹

Such a definition is fitting for the Soviets' methods as will be discussed below.

The Soviets believe that it is necessary to develop in the child, as early as possible, an active, positive relationship to the demands of adults, the desire to act in accordance with these demands and to do that which is declared to be necessary.

In following the orders, instructions, and advice of adults, the child demonstrates his obedience. By learning to obey from his youth to react to authority as something which is compulsory, the child will be accustomed to fulfilling demands made of him and will act accordingly as an adult. The object is to create, in essence, a new type of disciplined person, a "New Soviet Man."

This man is defined as being one whose thinking must be "correct," i.e. he must be dedicated to the furtherance of the revolution and totally convinced of the inevitability of the final victory of Communism. He must be "fearless, highly cultured and super competent."²

The new Soviet Man is an individual who subordinates his self interests to those of the wider community. He is solicitous of other people's welfare, a vigilant guardian of state property and diligent in his work habits. He shuns any ties with organized religion and unhesitatingly supports the Party's position on all domestic and international issues. He is law-abiding and observant of conventional behavior standards as defined by authority. Pursuing an alternative life style or participating in a 'counter culture' holds no attraction for him. He should have a communal attitude and manifest it in public work projects.³

Naturally, the most fertile bed in which to sow these seeds is the minds of those whose point of view has not yet gelled, the youth.

There are several organizations or activities in which a larger organization, concerned with indoctrination and run by the state, operates.

Most early influence is emitted at the places of youth general education or schools.

The nature of Soviet schools, from the standpoint of the composition of their general curriculum is not discussed in detail in this paper. Particular emphasis is given in the schools to the sciences and trade fields. This is in keeping with the technical goals and needs of the society as dictated by the Party through the state bureaucracy.

Attention will be given below to the technique of teaching which is the element of education germane to this report. It is here that the uniqueness of Communist education is plainly visible.

Another important organization with which virtually all Soviet citizens are associated in one way or another is the military. Attention to the Soviet military in general and adult military indoctrination will not be discussed in this paper. Discussion will concentrate on military and, especially, militaristic education of the youth. This is a key focal point of Soviet indoctrination.

Youth organizations in general comprise a sort of integument which embraces a person's activities in the schools, the military, and, in fact, any legal activity in which a person may participate. This understanding is critical in appreciating the extent of Soviet control over their people.

The paper is divided into five general sections. The first establishes an understanding of some apparent basic Russian and Communist motives, goals, and jargon and how they effect policies. The second section describes the forming of the institutions of youth indoctrination. The next section examines contemporary youth indoctrination. It is here that the pervasiveness of Communist indoctrination is discussed.

The emphasis of Soviet indoctrination is made clear in this section. The fourth section examines the apparent and theoretical effects of the indoctrination program. The effect of such a far-reaching, all-encompassing, and long-term program should be difficult to reverse quickly. Thus, somewhat concrete Soviet goals should be evident from the content of the Soviet youth indoctrination program. The last section deals with the dichotomy in which detente, a prevalent contemporary Soviet policy, is contrasted to militaristic indoctrination which is superficially opposed to the content of detente.

CHAPTER II

FACTORS BEHIND AND DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET POLICY

Thomas Hardy wrote in The Dynasts that history takes form with no more determinism than has a knitter whose fingers play in skilled unmindfulness. "The will is woven with an absent heed, sure life first was; and ever will so weave." Viscount Morley, an English statesman and writer, said that historic sense forbids us to judge results by motive, or real consequences by the ideals and intentions of the actor who produced them.¹

The Soviets, for their part, reject such a point of view. They, under Lenin's tutelage, have taken it upon themselves, in violation of the Marxist teachings to which they profess, to make history march to their own drum beat.

Certainly voluntarism is nothing new in the dreams of men, nor may we say that the Soviets have changed the course of events around them, or will. Nevertheless, their central driving force is to shape man's destiny while at the same time claiming that such a destiny is inevitable. That driving force is manifested in the Soviet program for the development of the youth of today, their future leaders.

Soviet programs are supposedly undertaken only after careful scientific scrutiny and may appear as schemes with purely ideological or Marxist-Leninist foundations. Surely, as will be seen, the Soviets claim that there is no such thing as a non-political act. They have attempted from the day that they seized power to insure that their every act displays movement toward their goal of Communism and, at least in

the present stage, reflects "socialist content." This does not mean that they are either successful in this, nor that their objectives and "socialist content" do not sometimes turn out to be less ideologically determined and based somewhat on their heritage.

It is necessary then to begin by examining briefly certain Russian and Communist developments and Soviet ideology which form the character of policy and its mechanism and generally guide them. If this is pointed out, it may help the reader to consider what may be traditional Russian interests and what are Communist ones.

Through history the Russians have displayed certain basic tendencies such as a propensity for centralism, orthodoxy to a creed or ideology, and a fear of attack or defensiveness.² These tendencies should contribute to the character of Soviet policies in general.

The Byzantine system in Russia was quite autocratic and subscribed to the concept of the oneness of church and state. Extreme centralization with a heavy ideological basis has, since then, developed as a precept to Russian thinking.³ It evolved that the political regime protected orthodoxy and that orthodoxy had to be spread.

The evolving self-burdened role of the tsar was the obligation of unifying the Slavs and subordinating other Russian princes to the Prince of Moscow.⁴

It is argued that the Soviet Russians of today remain dedicated to an ideology or that they are ideology bound. This is difficult to support in the affirmative, at least categorically, because their ideology has been altered greatly in order to allow them to survive and advance. They do cling tenaciously to certain tenets though.⁵

Ideology in anyone's hands can be a flexible tool to be held as a

guiding light or sacred composition of inviolably deterministic prophecies. But the moment ideology is changed in order to suit current needs, it cannot serve as a basis for prophesying the specific goals or policies of its "adherents."

Waldemar Gurian wrote:

we can track down the origin of a theory and study its thesis, but we cannot foresee what forms it will assume or to what results it will lead. It changes with the course of time; circumstances often cause secondary details to become of primary importance, and what seemed of the utmost moment to the originators recedes into the background.⁶

Ideology generally acts as a sanction for action. By itself it can serve to stimulate creative thought. The central function is psychological and ethical. It helps in retention of purpose and provides a set of maxims. However, the constant proclamation of a lofty ideology while practicing expedient policies can have a numbing effect on the objects of this dichotomy.

No aspect of [Communist] regimes is more intriguing than the increasingly psychological and manipulative role assigned to ideology by the Communists at the expense of its rational, intellectual integrity and the corresponding need for members of the society to find intellectual outlets elsewhere.⁷

The Soviets "show a great deal of ingenuity in explaining to the faithful how the policies which they pursue can be reconciled with the dogma which they profess to believe."⁸

The ideologically motivated war mentality typical of the Bolsheviks in 1918 has changed into a more methodological, pragmatic, and even cynical policy today.⁹ Cynical because the Soviets expend great energies on the study of revolution and, with the emotions of earlier days having subsided and with the failure of dogmatic applications, have deliberately

arrived at a pseudo-Marxist, but far more likely to succeed, formula. The relationship of this formula to youth indoctrination will be discussed below.

The need for vigilance is a prevalent theme in Soviet propaganda. They cite instances and suspicions of plots which are intended, they say, to harm the gains of the revolution. Such a defensiveness is not unique to the Soviet era in Russia.

At the time the Russians were implanting orthodoxy and the dynastic concept, the West was developing along different lines and saw the emergence of the nation state. With this came Russia's real isolation of several hundred years after the Mongols, an alien outside force, destroyed the Kievan Russ culture (1240-1480 A.D.). The mentality of the fortress state with a military character emerged largely from this and similar occurrences. This defensive attitude is pervasive in Russian policy in general.

The Russians, thus, have been traditionally at odds with their neighbors. An outlook of constant struggle, encirclement, and fight to the finish typify their point of view, Communist or not.

[They perhaps] imagine that someone else harbors aggressive impulses or designs similar to those in [their] own subconscious. Committed as they are to fight capitalism, they cannot imagine that the non-Communist world could ever really accept their existence.¹⁰

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Europe, in its international relations, was characterized generally by ideological (religious) conflicts. However, from the mid-seventeenth to the end of the nineteenth century, except for the period of the French Revolution, the pursuit of national power overshadowed religious motives. This allowed the scope

of purely strategic or pragmatic considerations to become much broader. Such pragmatism, if not opportunism, began to find itself among certain Russian revolutionary circles.

To a large degree such considerations were hidden from or ignored by the somewhat idealistic liberal democrats who thought that they saw their ideals materializing in this historic period. It would be difficult to say that certain revolutionary minds were closer to reality. Nevertheless, the eruption of World War I fulfilled the most gloomy concepts of man's worst traits and horrified and disillusioned the liberal democrats.

Revolutionary thought, combined with the disastrous effect of World War I and the Russian situation in particular, allowed the Bolsheviks to take over with their forceful tactics and disciplined organization.¹¹ The victory of voluntaristic revolutionary theory widened the gulf between the vindicated Marxist-Leninists and the "deterministic" Marxists and other revolutionaries. Much of the character of Soviet policies is colored by the opportunism and pragmatism which more and more overshadowed ideological "purity."

It is constructive to digress a bit more here in order to see youth indoctrination from the perspective of Soviet voluntaristic ideology and its place in their strategy of revolution and maintenance of power.

The key to the success of the revolution domestically or abroad has been found by the Soviets to be the intense organization of dedicated professional revolutionaries combined with the control of instruments of social control and coercion.¹² The most critical element of control is the military, though the Soviets in varying stages and combinations of infiltration and takeover, have concentrated on the police, newspapers,

key enterprises, labor unions, and banks.

Mass support for the Communists comes from the disenfranchised, those who have "nothing to lose" and/or those who are idealistic, naive, and susceptible to sweeping emotional programs of change. The type or class of person fitting into this category varies from society to society, but the youth remain basically, in any society, the perfect "culture" in which to grow the virus of revolution.¹³

Once power has been seized and the situation has been "stabilized," the Communists must maintain their power hold. This involves not only control of the political and economic structure but also the social structure. Housing and job allocation, control of travel, food "chits," general surveillance, a system of informers and the incessant promulgation of the Party line or indoctrination generally insure the status quo. The use of physical force or outright terror is not necessary, though it always remains as an alternative.¹⁴

The Soviets realize that their formula for revolution is a two-way street and thus must be alert, or vigilant, as they say, for counter-revolution. It is, then, important from an offensive and defensive standpoint to train their own citizens, to manipulate motivation, and to a degree, thought, so that their citizenry might act in a predetermined way. According to one observer, motivation control is the essence of Soviet totalitarianism and the Russian Communists' most original contribution.¹⁵

Lenin was the first statesman to bring together military and political thought in an innovative way in order to produce an ideological force.¹⁶ It is the contribution of his revolutionary element to the Russian defensiveness which has generated Soviet Communism.

At this point, attention should be given to the connotations of specific elements, conceptions, or jargon used in Soviet indoctrination. The meaning of policies and terms could be confused if not understood within their ideological context.

The element of struggle holds a prominent role in Soviet indoctrination programs. Lenin was dedicated to struggle. He studied Clausewitz but reversed Clausewitz's famous maxim and stated that politics is the continuation of war by other means.¹⁷

Struggle, or the dialectic, is supposed to produce something different, new, or advanced. It will be seen that struggle, war, and military preparedness are a main theme in the Soviet indoctrination program.

The idea of struggle is expressed by a question: "Who will win?" or who beats whom (kto-kovo in Russian). The effect produced or desired is that of an ever present enemy of some sort, or good against evil, or light versus dark.

The concept of kto-kovo, being a question, allows that the Soviet Communists might lose, at least temporarily. Lenin wrote in 1920:

as long as capitalism and socialism exist, we cannot live in peace, in the end one or the other will triumph - a funeral dirge will be sung either over the Soviet Republic or over World Capitalism.¹⁸

Lenin was convinced of the importance of struggle and had great insight into the power phenomenon. Lenin's motive was not coexistence but total victory. This victory or final peace is contingent on the party's victory.¹⁹

In no way does the Soviet use of the word "peace" insinuate pacifism. "Consistent revolutionaries," they say, "have nothing in common with plain pacifism or 'non-resistance to evil.'"²⁰

As the Communist word "peace" is qualified as a "just and democratic one" so they also qualify war. "Class substance" is the criteria they apply to the question of war or peace, i.e. there are "just" and "unjust" wars.²¹ Communists are not pacifists and only oppose those wars which do not further the revolution. Such wars may be labeled "imperialist wars of conquest," for example.

A congress of Communist philosophers in Varna in 1973 said that Marxist-Leninists "hate wars" but cannot reject them on principle.²² In fact, a leading Party figure said, also in 1973, that the Soviet Union fully recognized "the legitimacy, progressiveness and necessity of civil war."²³ Indeed, if deemed necessary, the Soviets may intervene militarily in another country. Socialist internationalism is their call word for foreign intervention and aggression. "The responsibility of a Soviet citizen for the well-being and prosperity of the motherland is inseparable from a profound interest in the fate of the world liberation movement," Pravda proclaimed.²⁴

They say that patriotism is internationalist but nationalism is bourgeois. Nationalism, they explain, promotes the exclusiveness of one's own country and thus serves the interests of the "ruling class." It is acceptable to be a Soviet nationalist patriot, however, since the Soviet Union is the main base of Communism and thus ultimately benefits the entire cause of world revolution.²⁵

The objective of a Communist peace or "anti-war" movement is therefore not rooted in nor motivated by pacifism but is part of an effort to de-promote something which is either harmful, not helpful to the revolution, or serves as a handy object of anti-war sentiment which stirs in the breast of most men. One Communist writer put it more bluntly. He

said that the anti-war movement serves to radically alter the system of international relations and make (so-called) detente irreversible.²⁶

The effective use of anti-war movements is clever and gains wide popularity because of its appeal to popular, if not universal, morality. This appeal to what is "good" or moral is an effective tool in the Soviet hands since it is difficult for one to argue against morality per se.

The Kremlin must nimbly juggle the contradiction in their domestic policy between presenting themselves as proponents of peace, no matter how qualified, and putting forward the line of constant struggle. They must be careful when they justify things in terms of morality too.

Universal morality is rejected by the Communists themselves. Value judgments based on universality are considered bourgeois. "Goodness" or "badness" is a politically defined quality to them.

Their foundations being irrelevant to mores their morality surely need not be otherwise. They thus seek practical methods by which extent social power structures might be loosened and then dismantled, and ways in which in the meantime these hostile power structures could be exploited to the Communists tactical advantage. Their means are open to sobriety and flexibility; however they are not committed to means /and thus/ they can cynically employ incomparable means simultaneously.²⁷

The victory of Communism is deemed so important that it serves as justification that any means may be employed to achieve this end or to further the revolution. The "sacred causes" of the Crusaders or the Moors were carried out under such messianic banners, as was the Spanish Inquisition.

Devotion to Communism - behavior appropriate to the needs of the construction of Communist society is the moral behavior of people. We judge the moral image of a man from the point of view whether his actions are in accordance with the needs for the construction of communism.²⁸

Anything which furthers the revolution is moral. The only thing immoral is that which, or those who, hinder progress toward Communism.²⁹ In fact, the Communists say that being moral can be immoral. "Where moral opposition to force or a moral commitment to military victory enters the picture, the scope of strategy is correspondingly restricted and the prospects of continuing political success are accordingly sacrificed."³⁰

This rationale has been a key to Communist advances and at the same time considered by them to be a major weakness in their opponents who are often hesitant because of moralizing and debating over whether applying similar tactics to the Communists would not make themselves "just like" the Communists.³¹

Various laws and legal norms themselves are subordinate to the "laws" of class struggle, to the laws of socialist development. Pravda claimed in 1968:

One must not lose a class approach /to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, for example/ because of formal juridical considerations. Whoever does so renounces the only true class criterion in appraising legal norms and begins to measure events by the yardstick of bourgeois law.³²

Lenin said that revolutionaries "who are unable to combine illegal forms of struggle with every form of legal struggle are poor revolutionaries indeed."³³

This rationalization of select morality is a main characteristic of Soviet policies. Certain Soviet policies might seem contradictory or appear as conciliatory or compromising. Indeed, they are likely to be an expedient to serve in some way the strengthening of the Soviet Union.

Thus, the Soviets may ally with Egypt while Egypt has outlawed the Communist party and imprisoned local Communists. The political situation in Egypt is thus basically irrelevant and hardly implies that Egypt is going "red." An alliance is as good as the intention of the signatories. Any alliance may be broken and the political value gained in the meantime may be deemed to outweigh the ideological "compromise."

Lenin, when referring to support that the Communists had given to the socialists, likened it to the support a rope gives to a hanged man.³⁴ He analogized the friendships, pacts, tactics, etc. used in the revolution to the zigzag course a mountain climber follows.

. . . To refuse beforehand to maneuver, to utilize the conflict . . . among one's enemies, to refuse to temporize and compromise with possible allies, is not this ridiculous in the extreme? Is it not as though, when making a difficult ascent of an unexplored and hitherto inaccessible mountain, we were to refuse beforehand ever to move in zig-zags, ever to retrace our steps, ever to abandon the course once selected to try others?³⁵

The need to emphasize the Soviet view on peace and war and tactics will become evident in the discussion concerning the emphasis of their indoctrination program. Of course, Soviet motive forces and reasoning must be kept in mind throughout the course of this paper. Their reasoning starts from a basic point of preconceived ideas or truths.

The Soviet Communists claim to be in possession of the laws of historical development and that they can forecast history. They insist that their evaluations and conclusions are scientific. Whatever their claims and whatever elements Marxist-Leninism has introduced to the Russian culture, Russian heritage provides important ingredients to their behavioral makeup. The Soviets' tortuous rationale might quickly build a wall between them and a non-Marxist-Leninist if not cloud their

intentions unless the non-Marxist-Leninist understands the elements of their rationale.

Whether it be arms control, the conference on security and cooperation in Europe, detente in general or policies concerning the indoctrination of their own youth, we must be careful in our analyses of the forces behind the policies. In attempting to determine Communist objectives, we must not only expect policies to reflect a certain character, we must consider the effects of a given policy to separate objectives from tactics.

CHAPTER III

THE NEED FOR INSTITUTIONS

It is necessary to turn now to a discussion of the Soviet Communists' state bureaucracy and the development of organs of youth indoctrination.

To discuss the Soviet indoctrination program and its associated bureaucracy without first mentioning the concept of the destruction of the state would appear to be taking the Soviet bureaucracy for granted.

Marx claimed that the state epitomized and was the instrument of class repression.¹ The existence of the Soviet State should be an anathema to a Marxist, especially since the later rationalization that the revolution must be protected and preserved is a rude distortion of a theory which claims at the same time that the victory of Communism is inevitable.

However, even Marx saw the necessity for the revolutionary forces to organize themselves into a power structure in order to overcome the "bourgeoisie" and sweep away "by force the old conditions of production."²

Lenin wrote in State and Revolution that so long as the state exists there is no freedom.³

The destruction of the state structure remained an essential element of Communist theory but Lenin explained that the destruction of the state is dependent upon the rapidity of the development of the higher phase of Communism which could be reached only by protracted struggle.⁴

After Stalin had seized power, he realized the difficulty and enormity of building a strong viable Soviet entity or power base. This

task required a huge state mechanism.⁵ Thus, the elimination of the state is postponed in practice. The need to destroy the state seems to be clouded by current rhetoric.

Since the state was to disappear along with the destruction of the coercive "modes of production" and since Lenin's seizure of power leap-frogged Marx's conceived flow of historical stages, Communist doctrine has little to say about the physical structure of a state. Soviets do try to build their state and its elements so that they might reflect a socialist character.

Thus, at least according to the way the Soviets claim to envision their bureaucracy, the existence of the Soviet state apparatus does not mean that the Soviets are converging with Western political and governmental concepts per se. Technical advancement and bureaucratic functions seem to be universally applied and thus, for the most part, unrelated to ideology.⁶

There is no doubt, however, that the state mechanism remains totally directed by the Party. The Party insures that reeducation and indoctrination are "smuggled in" to bureaucratic operations wherever and whenever possible. This is whence Soviet education, military training, youth organizations, clubs, newspapers, etc., receive their character.

From birth to death a person's life in the Soviet Union is constantly being affected by policies emanating from communal or socialist imperatives. The various institutions in which indoctrination may take place and where socialist qualities may be instilled play a key role in accomplishing this.

The Soviets would like to take a child at birth and place him in a scientific upbringing environment.⁷ Not only would the child be removed from "undesirable" influences at home, but his socialist maturity could be carefully developed. Naturally, the first problem with such a

plan would be the conflict with a basic social institution, an institution which has long existed in most societies--the family.

Marx was very clear in his statement about dissolving the family in order to stop the "exploitation" of children by their parents.⁸

Alexandra Kollontai envisioned the Soviet State as a "free union" of men and women who are lovers and comrades.

The worker mother who is conscious of her social function will rise to a point where she no longer differentiates between yours and mine; she must remember that these are hence forth only 'our' children, those of the Communist State, the common possessions of all workers.⁹

In the early days of the revolution, the family was said to exploit women. Lenin's wife, Krupskaya, called for the liberation of women and children from families.¹⁰

The requirements of the Soviet industrial revolution, social resistance, and creeping bourgeoisification altered early plans. Social and economic requirements especially called for stability. In the 1930's the family unit became more and more desirable and ultimately the only accepted social unit. Divorces became difficult to obtain. Housing allocations were such that even divorced persons were not guaranteed that they could move away from their estranged partners.¹¹

The austerity of the early years has been eroded. There remains a number of ill social effects from the Kremlin's policy to subvert the family in order to more perfectly control and indoctrinate its citizens. A. Svesenko, a Russian philosopher, wrote that the youth today are poorly prepared for the problems and realities of married, i.e. family life. According to a reporter, "The failure to prepare young people for conjugal life can be traced in part to . . . official Soviet policy."¹²

Certainly there is somewhat of a dilemma between the ideological needs of Party control over each individual, which is considered to be hampered by the family unit, and the needs of building Communism, which is largely dependent upon the material abundance of an advanced economy and which in turn has been most readily assured by a basically sound family unit. The dilemma is further complicated by the decline in birth rate, apparently because of labor demands on men and women and the lack of adequate child care facilities to allow women to lighten their weekly work load.

However, ideological imperatives plus certain realities encourage the occasional renewal of statements concerning "progressive" family policies.

S. G. Strumilin said that love and control with parents is important but communal institutions of upbringing are the way, and that man and wife, the former family, will then merge into collective adult households.¹³ The resultant public furor caused a restatement of policy to the effect that the Party never considered it possible to supplant the family by society.¹⁴

In 1956 collective upbringing was given impetus by the establishment of boarding schools (internats or shkoly internaty) which were called "schools of the new type" or "schools of the prolonged day."¹⁵ The student would go to school early and return home at 6 P.M. The cost and plausibility caused the plan to drift.¹⁶ A. G. Kharchev said that non-family upbringing deprived youth of necessary psychological stimulation.¹⁷

These apparent retreats have not meant a surrender in the Soviets' desire to influence each person individually and advance toward a communally structured society. The following quote by Makarenko is

instructive:

Our family is . . . an organic part of Soviet society. . . . Our parents are not without authority either, but this authority is only the reflection of social authority. In handing over to them a certain measure of social authority, the Soviet state demands from them correct upbringing [*i.e.* indoctrination] of future citizens. Nor is the family the sole or even the principal delegate of the society for the upbringing of children. Such primary responsibility is vested in still another social structure, the children's collective . . . such collectives constitute the basic structural units in all Soviet programs designed for the care or education of children.¹⁸

The future of state influence over Soviet youth is envisioned as follows by one Soviet writer:

. . . in the house families are living. Next door or not far away there is a building in which a boarding school complex is situated. Children from nursery to senior high school age spend their entire day there but in the evening, when their parents come home from work, they meet with their children. On those evenings when the parents are busy with civic obligations or go to the theater, the children remain in their boarding school. They stay there too when Mother goes to a hospital or travels somewhere in connection with her job. . . .

I know that this is the dream of many and many a mother. . . . Perhaps, when we are more prosperous, when we build Communism, we shall live exactly so!¹⁹

Soviet schools in the more typical sense have also undergone evaluation by the Soviets, especially since the Bolsheviks inherited extant educational institutions and since Communist ideals such as replacing the family with collective upbringing institutions have so far been frustrated.

The school is a very important institution since a student is in "school" and under its associated influence during his important formative years. The child is under the guidance of his teachers and peers for most of the day.

The Soviet education system is developed in a framework of rigorous specialization and is designed to train the students to perform certain well-defined professional tasks and to indoctrinate the students in order to create the New Soviet Man.²⁰ The emphasis in the curriculum is not knowledge for the sake of knowledge but rather to realize the energetic Soviet plans.²¹ Emphasis is on technical sciences, mathematics, etc. There is little liberal arts or social sciences presented.

The Soviet Union has so far reaped the economic benefits of an educated populace, though there are potential problems concerning the emergence of a more intellectually curious and ideologically obdurate citizenry.

Credibility is kept in check by controlling education so that events occur in the eyes of Soviet citizens in keeping with the way Marxism-Leninism said they must. This is because the leaders say that Marxism-Leninism is a science and only the Party is capable of interpreting it and guiding the masses. The Communists must write their school books to agree with the Marxist-Leninist explanations and predictions of social evolution.

Education was not generally available to Russians until the Bolshevik revolution after which it slowly became widespread. Soviet education has accomplished much since then, and today illiteracy is virtually unknown.

The motives of Soviet education are not necessarily altruistic, however. An ignorant man cannot become "class conscious" and thus cannot sense the revolution as well as a correctly educated one.

Wasyli Shimonian claims that the Soviets spent generously on education for the sake of the consolidation of power. "The key to what has

been going on in the Communist politics," he says, "lies in the growth and consolidation of personal power in the hands of small groups of men, with education, too, being utilized to serve this purpose."²²

Mass literacy was used to insure that the ideas of the dominant ideology received the widest publicity. Subsequently, the Soviet people get an intensely narrow view of the world and the Soviet Union's place in it.²³

The development of Soviet schools and educational policy was the product of a long and sometimes slow evolution. After the regime came to power, it sought to abolish the established bourgeois institutions according to ideological imperatives mentioned above. The resultant education system was somewhat anarchistic. Grading and testing systems and traditional classroom settings were disregarded. To a large degree the Komsomol was a powerful force in deciding educational policies.²⁴ There was no distinction between boys and girls and education was provided free.

During the civil war the lack of education policy helped to destroy the former system. However, in the 1920's the stability brought about by a relative peace and the new economic policies allowed for some sober thinking. The Party could lose control in an anarchistic situation.

The Communists had had problems with overzealists in training and indoctrination. Given a free hand, inquisitions had occurred. Komsomolites were honoring the illiterate person because he epitomized the working class. They were accusing the worker who had acquired an education of having detached himself from the masses and of having ceased to be in the working class.²⁵ Even today the effects of such a policy are felt.

In the Ural State University, of 483 students accepted for day courses in 1960-61, more than half had dropped out. Students were unprepared for courses of study and were unable to fulfill curriculum requirements. The reason for the unpreparedness was because of the old entrance regulation which stipulated that 80 per cent of those accepted for entry to a higher educational institution had to be "worker qualified." That is, they had to have worked two years before applying. The regulations are incomplete, according to one professor there, because in these conditions, the level of education is not the sole criterion for admission.²⁶

The first Five Year Plan in the late 1920's had a particularly profound effect on the Soviet society. The educational policies were reexamined. The anarchy of the early years disappeared and was replaced by a rigid, disciplined system. Today the school institutions are much like those in the West. Methods of teaching will be discussed below.

Programs for the training of youth in military skills also began their growth from the early days of the revolution.

The use of young people in the civil war had been somewhat successful. The growth of a coordinated program for the military training of youth was begun very early. Since the Bolsheviks assumed that domestic and international struggle were inevitable, military defense and preparedness were of utmost importance.

After the civil war, military training was promoted especially for the members of the Komsomol youth organization with military service serving to strengthen their ideological reliability.²⁷

In 1924 a civil defense organization was formed, the "Society of

Friends of Chemical Defense and Chemical Industry."²⁸ In 1927 this and several other societies dealing with military training and civil defense merged to form a broader group known as the Osoaviakhim. This voluntary organization existed until 1948. In fact, it was not until 1966 that participation in pre-induction military training was mandatory except in times of national emergency.²⁹

The growing Nazi threat led to increased military training in the late 1930's. In 1939 a decree for military training in secondary schools from the fifth grade on to the higher learning institutions was issued.³⁰ After the war, preconscription military training reverted to a voluntary status.

In 1948 the Osoaviakhim was divided into three societies, one for each branch of the military. In 1951 these three were amalgamated and a larger single organization known as DOSAAF emerged (the All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force and Navy).³¹

In the late 1940's military training was linked to intensive physical training.³² Marksmanship, for example, was undertaken to develop "watchfulness, endurance and will power." These traits were necessary in the defenders of the homeland. As one teenage girl said, "today, we hunters are excellent marksmen, but tomorrow from the hunter will be formed regiments and under Stalin's orders, if the homeland calls, we, proud and brave, will march ever forward."³³

The emphasis on military training and indoctrination has not slackened with the relaxation of the cold war. In the early 1960's, the Party called for the strengthening of military education. In 1965 the All-Union Youth tour was organized through which youth travel to historical revolutionary, military, and labor sites.³⁴

In 1967 a new law on universal military service was introduced. Persons 18 years old would be drafted for two years of military service in the Army and Air Force, or three years in the Navy, or one year for persons with higher education.³⁵ Since the normal tour had been shortened, an obligatory preconscription military training program was introduced. This was paralleled by an increase in civil defense instruction.³⁶

In order to oversee, coordinate, and direct all youth activities a youth group was needed. This group would provide indoctrination, surveillance, social activities, organization and control of youth. In 1918 the Young Communist League (Komsomol) was formed. Control being an important aspect, this youth group could certainly not be autonomous or parallel the party's structure or power.³⁷

In the Soviet Union there are, categorically, no independent non-state-directed organizations with which a youth may associate. The Soviet Constitution makes this law when it states that the Party is the leading core of all organizations.³⁸

The Communist Party would never allow the Komsomol to develop any autonomy. No act by a Komsomolite would be tolerated if it in any way presented the slightest impediment to control by the Party leaders. "The very establishment of a youth auxiliary was delayed until control was assured."³⁹ The Komsomol had to have "mass character" and no rivals in the field of youth groups. It was made as large as possible, consistent with Party control but not so large and so loose as to develop cohesiveness or mind of its own. A young Communist's party would never be allowed. Thus, early reference to the Komsomolites as "young Communists" was later dropped. This would squelch the chance of any reform evolving out of the youths' thought. They could call themselves

"autonomous" or "self standing" but were never allowed to use the word "independent."⁴⁰

Voluntary movements are labeled as traitorous⁴¹ and are considered a threat to the central power of the Party.

Initiative and independent thinking is discouraged in the Soviet Union whether it be in the form of group or individual thinking or action.

I. A. Pechernikova says:

What about developing independence in children? The answer: If a child does not obey and does not consider others, then his independence invariably takes ugly forms. Ordinarily this gives rise to anarchistic behavior, which can in no⁴² way be reconciled with laws of living in Soviet society.

Party leaders "lashed out" at Moscow's ideological adversaries and told the Party's twenty-fourth congress that there should be no letup in resistance to ideas not approved by the Kremlin.⁴³

All youth organizations (including the Pioneers and Little Octobrists which are comprised of younger children) are supervised by the Central Committee and led by older officials.⁴⁴ The Party, the sole ruling social and political force, has recruited a number of the young educated elite to consolidate its power in part through the operation of this vast centrally run network of youth organizations.⁴⁵

The strength and weakness of the youth program is that it is stilted and run by political personnel and an agency of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and not a youth organization of, and for, youth.⁴⁶ The Party, perhaps knowing that the youth program is "stilted," etc., would have it so in preference to losing control.

Soviet policies are an attempt to insure a general trend and character, i.e. the building of a Communist or new Soviet society and the

strict guidance toward that end by the Soviet Communist Party. Though the "purity" of ideological practices may be questioned, the Soviets have developed a rebuttal which seems to be satisfactory to them: the Party is the only organism capable of seeing the correct road to Communism and may deviate as it sees fit in consideration of its own survival and role. Bureaucratic institutions have been created or have been allowed to continue to exist to insure that survival and role. Through the indoctrination of its people and the subsequent progressiveness of their society, those deviations may be reduced in scope and frequency.

CHAPTER IV

YOUTH INDOCTRINATION TODAY

Today the Soviets are increasing their concern for developing a sound and reliable youth. The formative student years draw particular attention as being the period when a good citizen is most likely cultivated.

The process of indoctrination goes on at the Party cells, groups, detachments, and brigades of the various youth organizations. These are located in all schools and work places and there is a large element in the armed forces. There is a youth commission in the Supreme Soviet to deal with youth indoctrination and paramilitary training. The ministries of education at the All-Union and republic level are also deeply involved.¹

For the individual person, Soviet indoctrination begins formally in school. The student is told that he is an equal member of society.² From the beginning, emphasis on communal ownership is stressed. "Mine is ours, ours is mine." Complex toys are designed which require cooperation of two or three children to make the toys work.

The Soviets put emphasis on character education (vospitanie) or upbringing to develop Communist morality.

A child enters school when he is seven years old.³ From then until he is about eleven years old,⁴ he will be taught a sense of good and bad behavior; truthfulness, honesty, kindness; atheism; science versus superstition; self discipline; diligence in work; care of possessions; friendship with classmates; and love of one's own locality and the Motherland.⁵ Teachers are to "spare no effort" so that young people will worthily carry on the cause of their fathers and the cause of Lenin.⁶

Children's activities are done in the context of children's collectives. Each classroom is a unit of the Communist youth organization. For the first three grades, all youth belong to the "little Octobrists."⁷

The school is designated as a brigade (druzhina). The class is designated as a detachment (otriad). The class is subdivided into links (zveno) which usually are manifest in rows of double desks.

The group determines the status of the member and vice versa. Interplay and cooperation are the key. Self-criticism and opinion of the group are important. Judgments of the group and its interests prevail over the individual's. Older groups "adopt" younger groups to take care of them, like a big brother. The school itself will be a ward of a factory or a municipal bureau.

In the first grade the first step is to teach the children conformity. Independent thinking or action is neither cultivated nor desired (see above).

L. I. Novikova's manual says: "do not use direct commands to youth like 'Sit Up!', instead say, 'which row can sit the straightest'?"⁸ This is quickly replaced by the teacher asking which row can as a group sit up the straightest. The teacher will not praise students for doing what is expected. Praise only comes for doing extraordinary things. At first, the positive is accented.⁹ By using the row in a classroom as a group, one quickly learns that if he does not conform and sit up, then he pulls his row "down."

On the one hand, the individual is learning conformity and to respond to peer pressure. On the other, a definite sense of competition, at the group level, is fostered. The Soviets, however, claim to reject the United States' cultivation of competition.¹⁰

Soon the teacher has helpers who point out who is not sitting up straight. A record is kept, not by individual, but by row. It is encouraged to try to beat the monitor at his own game. That is, can one find more faults with himself than the monitor has noticed, or better still, before he has noticed? The students are in essence competing with the monitor. Parents serve as "monitors" at home and submit reports on deviations committed at home.

In this way the system of the government's watchful eye is initiated. Throughout a Soviet person's life, his attitude and actions will be recorded. This important facet of control will determine a person's eligibility for jobs, social benefits, and even the type of quarters to which he is assigned to live.¹¹

The row evolves into the Party cell of the "Little Octobrists," the youth group for children in the first three years of school.

Soon, still in the first grade, the students are setting their own examples. Winners are allowed to leave class first and are photographed in class uniform (a kerchief). This photograph is posted on the wall newspaper. They also visit other winning cells.¹² This pattern for discipline and the incentive gained from competition is thus planted very early.

After a period of accentuating the positive, the negative is pointed out. The class is asked how to discipline a problem student. After "listening" to suggestions, the teacher "helps" students make the right decisions.

Peer criticism and the encouragement of informing on others is an important part of Soviet social control. One might be expected to fear that an "incorrect" action which he has committed has been reported to

the authorities for inclusion into an individual's attitude record. Informing is not pictured by Soviet indoctrination as a base or cowardly act. Deviants are enemies of the revolution and must be ferreted out.

The Soviets have a martyr who symbolizes the tradition of informing on social wrongdoers. His name was Pavlik Morozov. He was a pioneer during the period of land collectivization. Pavlik denounced his own father as a collaborator with the Kulaks and testified against him in court. Pavlik was killed by the people of the village for revenge.

In general principle, Soviet children are not encouraged to resist family authority. However, Pavlik Morozov's example is considered a positive virtue and an example to the youth of what would be an approved act in similar circumstances.¹³

A person learns over the years just what decisions are "correct" and which are not. The group situation aids in determining for the individual socially correct habits.

This adherence to social pressure is cultivated in diverse ways. For example, Soviet students take a kind of "TAT" (thematic apperception test) but, unlike similar tests in the United States, there is a correct interpretation to each picture. Often the answer is hardly subtle.¹⁴

Deviants or worse delinquents are usually kept in line initially through peer warning, censure, public condemnation, or public shaming or ridicule.¹⁵ When these methods fail, more positive action is taken. A recalcitrant minor offender may be brought before a "comrade's court." These are legal and officially recognized. The courts may even condemn legal acts as being "socially undesirable."

The court situation uses peer participation and, hopefully, peer

pressure. If this is not effective, the court may suggest to the higher judiciary that a deviant be sent to labor camps for a short time.

Final control measures include expulsion or ostracizing one from his youth organization. This can ruin his future career. They can even exclude him from using recreation facilities since the Komsomol operates them. (By the same token, expulsion puts one outside the potential influence of the Komsomol.)

Peer criticism is a great lever if it works. Instances occur, however, where peers "protect" each other or intercede, thus subverting Komsomol authority. This "cooperation" may be generated because the deviant has acted against adult authority, like committing a non-criminal act such as "slacking off." This might have only hurt a manager's or an adult's plan. Thus, the younger ones might identify with their peer as a type of group protection against the adults because of the adults' incessant demands. There is also the old rule of helping each other in a jam, or the "golden rule."¹⁶

As the child grows, he is inculcated with the desired basic Communist qualities. As he matures, he becomes potentially more independent and in need of more sophisticated ideological training and more encompassing activities. The child has already been under the wing of the Little Octobrists until he became about eight years old. The main job of the Little Octobrists is to indoctrinate the youth in patriotism.

When the child reaches the fourth grade and is approximately ten years old, he joins the "Pioneers." Membership, like the Little Octobrists, is universal.¹⁷ Patriotism is still emphasized along with "Communist Morality" which includes the groundwork for instilling atheism. It is important to the Soviets that their people owe no other allegiance,

even a spiritual one, to anything but the Party and the revolution.¹⁸

The training of the Pioneers focuses on discipline. The Pioneers oversee the afternoon time of youth whereby potentially idle time is taken up. Camping, hiking, etc. are the usual activities. Their slogan is "always prepared." Every Pioneer group is headed by a Komsomol member. Pioneer "palaces" have quality facilities and some include an electronic workshop or a planetarium for example. Organizationally, the Pioneers are a school level group, as the Little Octobrists, with few national level activities as such. Both are in fact "junior forms" of the Komsomol. They are not "separate" youth organizations but administered through the Komsomol.

As the student matriculates and matures, the content of indoctrination becomes more complex. There remain, of course, certain basic themes. Social science courses prove the superiority of the Socialist system. History courses emphasize Lenin's teaching on constant readiness to defend the heroic record of the Soviet people, the need to strengthen the Soviet Union and Marxist analysis of war. Literature courses reveal the source of courage and patriotism of the Soviet people and formulate a picture of the ideal defender. Music lessons inspire patriotism and martial spirit. Science classes tell of the primacy of Soviet science in space.

For the greater period of a youth's life, up to about the age of twenty-eight, one may join the Komsomol (the All-Union Leninist Communist League of Youth). The object of the Komsomol is to give indoctrination and apprenticeship for the CPSU. Whereas membership in the Little Octobrists and Pioneers is virtually 100 per cent for the appropriate ages, membership in the Komsomol is more select, though still widespread. Membership is about 50 per cent of the eligible youths.¹⁹

From the beginning of youth indoctrination, stress has been laid on

patriotism and the acceptance of authorities. By the time a youth enters the Komsomol, he is already deeply imbued with these teachings. Experts say that by adolescence value orientations and behavior inclinations are well developed and highly resistant to change. So it would follow that the Komsomol's influence can only reinforce behavior. The key is the earlier social experience of the Soviet youth.²⁰ Therefore, the responsibility of the Komsomol is not to introduce new values but to supplement and reinforce the socialization lessons already learned. The Komsomol also serves the important role of providing activities so that the youth is not troubled by the "ills" of idle time.

Komsomol membership covers ages 14-28.²¹ This is a critical time period since the youth at this time may no longer be under the influence of the schools. Compulsory education ends in eight years at age 15-16.²² The majority of the youth work after they leave school.

The Komsomol is barely in evidence rurally where one-third of the population still lives. Actually, only in educational institutions can the Komsomol claim universal membership. It is interesting to note that the highest number of deviants occur outside the Komsomol's influence. This "deviance" also includes actual crimes.²³

In 1966 a checkup on the Komsomol was preceded by a "far-reaching" program of indoctrination aimed at strengthening the political convictions of Komsomol members and Soviet youth in general. This program seemed to "betray an almost frantic concern" of the Komsomol leaders to capture the minds of youth.²⁴

Those who would stay outside of the Komsomol would have less and less success of gaining social opportunities as opposed to the advantages of being a Komsomol member. For example: The CPSU has fourteen million

members, or 9 per cent of the adult population 18 years or older. Progress to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union through the Komsomol is critical for one's success.²⁵

A rule says that "anyone under 23 who wishes to enter the Party can do so only through the Komsomol."²⁶

The importance of the Komsomol for advancement to the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) leads members of the Komsomol who aspire to Party membership to become elitist. "The leading members of the Komsomol look upon the rank and file of the membership as their subjects on a lower plane of Soviet society while the ordinary Komsomol member regards the leaders of the Komsomol as Party henchmen."²⁷ However, a leader is evaluated according to the degree of his success in handling his group. He may patronize and even coerce his group to improve his image to his superiors. If he goes too far, antagonism may result and be manifest in large dropout rates.

Soviet writers say that the problems of the Komsomol stem from bureaucratic formalism and poor training of youth leaders with consequent ineptitude in directing youth energies.²⁸

Democratic principles are proclaimed but disregarded by the Komsomol. The Komsomol has a long tradition of calling for increased democracy within the organization even while forbidding it.²⁹

The Komsomol is more than just an organization for controlling Soviet youth and indoctrinating them toward becoming New Soviet Men. It contributes to the economy by providing a labor force. It is important in the armed forces. It has built whole towns, for example Komsomolsk in Siberia.³⁰ The Komsomol provides study groups for youth which amounts to a continuing education program. Komsomol members are used as police. Komsomolites participate in the protection of public property.

The Komsomol has operated in an important way within the military. Its purpose in the military is political indoctrination and assistance in maintaining military discipline. The Komsomol is subordinate to the military commanders and Party political workers.

In time of war the Komsomol has become an arm of the military. Their organizations could be taken en toto and made into a fighting unit. In the past conflicts members have served as clerks, ski troops, bicycle units (such as in Petrograd), youth detachment (in the Urals) and have manned an armored train (in the Ukraine).³¹ Most, however, went into the Red army as commissars, agitators, and combat troops. Members would also collect funds for the Red Army, treat the wounded in hospitals, combat desertion, and help soldiers' families with harvesting. However, the Central Committee in 1919 voted against Komsomol cells in army units, calling it a double apparatus and that it also bred separatism "inimical to military units."³²

Today there is a more specific organization which specifically serves to prepare the Soviet youth in various ways for military duties. It is the DOSAAF (mentioned above). The DOSAAF is a paramilitary organization for civilian youth administered in cooperation with the Komsomol. It deals in preinduction training.

DOSAAF works in conjunction with the Komsomol, Ministry of Defense, the Council of Trade Unions, civil defense authorities, the ministry of education, and various sport societies. The main mission of DOSAAF is to prepare youth physically, psychologically, technically, and to make it easier and faster to train them as a soldier later. The Soviets hope that better quality and more candidates will join the military than before as a result of militaristic education and preinduction training.³³

(Since the DOSAAF is concerned with preinduction training and thus with older youth, for the sake of chronology, further discussion will continue below.)

Military type activities and training are introduced at an early age. In fact:

The formation of a soldier . . . begins at the first signs of maturity, during the time of adolescent dreams. This theory now is in actual practice. Children's books, glorifying war and military life are attractively illustrated and sold at extremely low prices.³⁴

Nikolai A. Linkov, a Soviet psychiatrist, condoned the sale of war toys in the Soviet Union, saying that it was "good" for them to play with toy guns "providing they stick to revolutionary liberation games."³⁵

There are organized military patriotic activities and competitive events throughout the year. These include events from children's war games to marksmanship competition. They even have news reporting by young correspondents. Local and national children's military activities stress competition, exercises and war games, e.g. "capture the sentry," "remain undetected," "defend the bridge."³⁶ More advanced games include signal flag use, gas mask training, and decontamination procedures.

Camps are held which teach military lessons. Themes include: "to Pioneers concerning the defenders of the Homeland," "to Pioneers--future defenders of the Homeland," and "I am studying bravery."³⁷ The national militarized game is called "Zarnitsa" or summer lightning. It is sponsored by the Central Committee of the Kom mol and supported by the Minister of Defense. In April 1972 a new national military sport game called "Orlenok" or Eaglet was announced.³⁸ General education and vocational schools for fifteen to seventeen year olds participate in this.

The Zarnitsa will continue apparently for younger school children.

Military training is a component part of the entire Soviet education system.³⁹ In training, combat readiness is a must, as is the will to victory. Everyone of draft age must: know the rules of military conduct and courtesy; have a reasonable picture of military life and discipline; be trained in the use of light weapons; be trained in rudiments of small unit tactics; have a basic knowledge of a military specialty; understand civil defense in theory and practice; and have passed norms in physical activity. Girls have similar requirements with the accent being on nursing, etc.

Throughout the grade progression, the students receive progressive doses of militaristic propaganda. One can read such things as the "military glory of their fathers remains the brightest guiding star for our young people."⁴⁰

Such a situation contrasts sharply with that in the United States. De-heroization seems to be the vogue and there is little stress on the accomplishments of the older generation and little emphasis on civic duty.

In the Soviet Union de-heroization or the idea of the anti-hero is "alien to the very essence of Soviet literature." To promulgate this message, the Soviets have instituted the Znaniye society which annually gives 500,000 lectures on military-patriotic themes. In the Kursk region's district newspapers published 800 articles on this subject in 1971. The Central Television and All-Union Radio devote 20-30 hours each month to this theme. Eight million people receive the Komsomol newspaper in the Soviet Union and ten million the Pioneer newspaper.⁴¹

"Heroes" in the Soviet Union are seldom sports figures. Labor heroes are common, as are those who contribute significantly to society, such as

heroine mothers. Of course, those who died during the civil war and collective period (like Pavlik Morozov), or in the Patriotic War (World War II) are held in high esteem. In modern times the cosmonauts are heroes, as are the "defenders" of the isolated island of Damanskiy in 1969.

There is a sort of war creed for Komsomolites. They will not let themselves be taken prisoner, for capture is for them a dishonor, an indelible disgrace. "Among our youth there cannot be deserters. Treason, betrayal of the homeland, is the most despicable and serious crime, the most infamous deed against the revolutionary people. The young Soviet people do not fear death on the field of battle and will not lose their heads under the fire of the enemy."⁴²

Visitations to historical sites provide an important element to the graphic impact of the indoctrination program. The Komsomol organizes pilgrimages to many sites throughout the Soviet Union. Marches are held along past army routes after which the youth swear loyalty to the motherland or make pledges.

Stories of war or military exploits are widespread in the Soviet press. The content of the material serves to instill those virtues which are desired in Soviet patriots.

The following lines are from a description of the fighting in a border dispute between the Soviet Union and China. Some of the virtues implied are presented through a narrative: "Despite wounds received in the fighting, two soldiers dashed forward and in doing so inspired their comrades to the rear." Some of the other desired virtues are stated as proverbs in the story: "He who spares the enemy will himself be injured" and "No one shows mercy on the battlefield."⁴³

Actual preinduction training, which is certainly enhanced by the years of previous military accented activities, begins when a youth is from 16-18 years of age. These persons would expect to be conscripted within two to three years.⁴⁴ The objective of preinduction training is to show fundamentals of military service, give an introduction to military knowledge, and allow the new conscriptees to blend more confidently and assimilate duties more rapidly.

In carrying out this program, there is much physical training, especially in "military-technical" sports, i.e. sports with a military application. These activities or games often compare to the Boy Scouts'. The program insures the Party's objectives to the largest number possible and completion is manifested in an insignia which reads "ready for the defense of the Motherland." They become a type of material hero. There are medals for everything.

The latest program is labeled, "prepared for labor and for defense of the U.S.S.R." and was established in 1971. It has since been enlarged.⁴⁵ It has additional military-sport requirements and includes younger children.

The Soviets are worried that there are shortcomings in their pre-induction training program, however. The program itself is beset with difficulties typical of a bureaucracy, though that is not to say that these problems cannot in the long run be ironed out. The DOSAAF is not producing sufficient numbers of trained military specialists and technicians.

There have been younger Soviet military leaders promoted recently. Some see it as a need for rejuvenation.⁴⁶ The new military leaders lack World War II experience but are at home with technical weaponry. The

number of applications for professional military training is disappointing in spite of the massive propaganda campaign.⁴⁷ One typical Communist weakness is the complicated division of responsibility in the training organization. Perhaps most problems are simply those of the technical age. It is difficult to train a large technical army with advanced technological equipment.

Any problems must be considered from the perspective of the scale of Soviet preinduction training. The Soviet program dwarfs similar training in the United States for example. A comparison of the two world powers' programs shows that in the period 1971-72 there were 4.5 million military trainees in the Soviet Union. In the United States during the same period around 90,000 cadets were trained.⁴⁸ The reason that so many persons in the Soviet Union receive military training is because it is national policy and the facilities and organizations are widespread.

Paramilitary clubs and study circles include young sailors, soldiers, border guards, aviators, and artillerymen. Periodically, "tests" or "reviews" are given to demonstrate knowledge. Schools and clubs have a sister unit in the military. There is real contact between the two. Thousands of enlisted men and cadets run technical clubs in schools or factories and are part-time Pioneer leaders.

There are 120 Soviet military schools or colleges. The Soviet Union conscripts about 800,000 youth yearly, which is about 40,000 fewer than the total strength of the United States Army. It appears that the number of conscriptees promoted to officer will have to increase.⁴⁹ The military training involves a considerable degree of athletic and physical training. The Soviets' success at the Twentieth Olympic Games could be attributed largely to the extensive participation of military sports.

clubs. An analysis of the Soviet olympic participants' club affiliation shows that 157 of them, or 27 per cent, belong to various military sports clubs.⁵⁰

In the 1975 World Ice Hockey Championships, the Soviet team ravaged the United States College All-Star team. The Soviet team, which defeated the Canadians' professional team in October 1974, was far from being comprised of a group of college students. The Soviet team was made up of mostly Red Army soldiers who are assigned to Moscow club teams and practice together year around.⁵¹

One of the requirements for all youth sports events is that they include military-related sports. For example, in the Fifth All-Union games in military-technical sports in 1970 there were 21 million participants. Ratings of achievement were given to participants.⁵² Note that these sports programs are in addition to the 140 hours of preinduction training for 16-18 year olds.⁵³

The stress on military-patriotic education has fluctuated with changing priorities, the perception of the leaders to the international situation, and estimates of special problems that arise from attitude and behavior of the younger generation. The efforts to instill in their youth a sense of nationalism, militarism, and readiness for war are today on a scale unprecedented in peacetime, even in the Soviet Union, and appear to be leading to the militarization of the Soviet education system.⁵⁴

As noted above, ideological indoctrination, especially in the realm of military patriotic education, was given significant impetus in 1966 as well as having been made mandatory for the first time in times of peace. The reason for this stepped-up indoctrination of students was that the regime noted a slacking off of ideological training and called for this

slack to be taken up.⁵⁵ New syllabi were drawn up which differed from the old ones in that they concentrated far more on studying the classics of Marxism-Leninism and on studying Party activity and the decisions of Party congresses. The syllabus material helps to train young specialists in a spirit of patriotism and provides space for criticizing bourgeois ideology, reformism, revisionism, and dogmatism.⁵⁶

In 1972 a decree on higher education called for better teaching of Marxism-Leninism and a more profound study of the works of its founders and Party documents. This is so that students may develop a proper class approach and "an ability to criticize anti-Marxists in a well-reasoned manner."⁵⁷

Though up to now Soviet students have shown little eagerness to join the waves of unrest among young people that have affected so many countries, the concern to inoculate against possible infections may underlie policy of the renewed emphasis on ideological education.⁵⁸ The danger of "infection" from outsiders is increased by prospects of more contacts with outsiders due to activities stimulated by detente.

Much of the practical training is not new but the scope and emphasis of the present program of indoctrination are the biggest since World War II. A generation is being made to fear and hate Western democratic countries.

Even with detente on everyone's lips, the actual actions of the Soviets in this long-range program give rise to doubt concerning their sincerity. They are becoming aggressive and have shown their heavy hand in Czechoslovakia as recently as 1968. The Soviet Navy has recently completed world-wide maneuvers for the first time.

Soviet Major General Zemskov has defended the need for a high level

of military training. He cites the fact that the Soviet Union has had to spend nearly 20 of the 52 years since the revolution fighting invasions or repairing a war-damaged economy. The first challenge, he recalls, was immediately after the revolution when the Red Army fought the counterrevolutionaries and interventionists.⁵⁹

The Soviets have had enough personal justification to adopt a defensive attitude even if Russian history had not bequeathed a heritage of repelling invaders. However, it would be somewhat presumptuous to dismiss the widespread Soviet military preparedness fever simply as an "understandable" and "legitimate" action prompted by a cruel past. The assertion of an ever present external threat can lend a degree of legitimacy and credibility to demands for political orthodoxy and loyalty. By advancing the constant hatred of foreigners, the Soviet citizen may be insulated against foreign influence and there is a justification for sustained mobilization.

It is well within the calculations of men to seize upon nationalism or patriotism and use it far beyond its natural scope. Furthermore, the pride and values generated by reflecting on the defeats of their enemies acts as an identity between youth and the older generation. Particularly, since with no actual experience, the Soviet youth must be taught to hate enemies of the Soviet Union.

Each generation moves farther away from the situation in which the original revolutionaries found themselves and inevitably is affected less and less by the faiths, emotions, and ambitious ideas which prompted these men and women to act. Present Soviet youth have not had the heroic experience of the revolution nor witnessed the rapid industrialization, the purges nor war. They might be expected to slip into nonconformism.

The Communists are having difficulty instilling orthodoxy or the sacred conviction to Communism, especially since industrial development, education, and subsequent sophistication lead to secular interests. They are having difficulty in these times fostering "revolutionary elan."⁶⁰

The youth must be made to understand the threats facing the Soviet Union and the need for constant readiness for war. As contacts with outsiders increase, the Soviet citizens are warned against subversives and spies who speak about freedom, democracy, the high standard of living, and the desire for peace in the West. They are warned against Western pen pals and stamp exchange pals because they are supposedly exploited by Western intelligence.⁶¹

They say that individual young men and women, lacking experience of life and political maturity, often come under the influence of bourgeois propaganda.⁶² It is illegal for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda. That is how they refer to the underground press in the Soviet Union. It appears, however, that the underground press is more of a product of Soviet citizens' desire to find out what is going on in the world. (One of the recent underground publications was called The Chronicle of Current Events.)⁶³

One may question whether the Party is furthering the revolution by the constant manipulating and control of every detail of society and the constant hammering of militaristic propaganda. The existence of an underground press, public apathy toward the media,⁶⁴ and general dissatisfaction with the non-availability of information⁶⁵ would seem to be a less desirable situation than the gains of incessant indoctrination.

CHAPTER V

POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF SOVIET INDOCTRINATION

The nature of the Soviet society makes it very difficult to obtain direct evidence which concerns negative attitudes among its populace. Though the voices of some dissidents have been heard recently, the fate of those who oppose the system is an uncomfortable one. The expulsion of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn from his home country, presumably never to be allowed to return by the Soviets, bears simple testimony.¹

According to the testimony of defected KGB members, some 7,000 persons have been induced to undergo fake psychiatric treatment which has involved chemical lobotomies. These victims did not have the protection which international notoriety afforded Solzhenitsyn. They were punished for simply opposing the Soviet system too vigorously.²

Most persons have adjusted better to the far-reaching methods of Soviet control and at least do not voice their opposition (if they are indeed opposed). Western estimates claim that the KGB (Committee for State Security) has a staff of 490,000, many of whom are engaged in tracking down internal dissidents.³ One Soviet citizen ventured to say that living in his country was like living in a cage.⁴

The cage-like atmosphere would be described as such, not because there are armed soldiers and barbed wire on every street corner, there are not, but because of strategic social controls, especially, for example, job allocation. If someone appears to be too curious of Western information from a visiting tourist, he may be quietly escorted away by the ubiquitous militia, and/or lose his job.⁵

Penalties for protest include arrest, lengthy imprisonment, and

future blackballing in the Soviet society. "Perhaps no wonder then, that most Soviet youth are careful to keep their noses clean, their hair short and their activities within sanctioned rules. . . . For most of them membership in the Komsomol is taken for granted."⁶

If a court passes a sentence depriving a teenager of liberty, he is put into an education work colony. There are two types. One has a general, the other a strict regimen. Young offenders are sent to one or the other, depending on the gravity of the crime. First offenders whose crimes were not dangerous are put in colonies with a general regimen. There are separate colonies for girls.⁷ After two suspensions from school, one student was eventually sentenced to a year and a half in prison.⁸

Persons living in such a society would learn to conform if they cared to live comfortably. Thus, information critical of the regime would be hard to come by. One student said, "We have a saying over here. Everyone keeps as quiet as fish."⁹

Soviet students would be expelled from the schools, which are all state owned, if they expressed an incorrect attitude toward the system.

The same people who control who gets into a university, control us once we're enrolled. We're all organized into student unions, and they're run by the Party people. When it comes time to apply to a university, most young people belong to the Komsomol. It's a lot easier to get in if you do belong; at least that's why we joined.¹⁰

Generally, such direct attitude statements are rare. Even a visitor to the Soviet Union may not be able to obtain first-hand information because close surveillance and control do not permit him to speak freely with Soviet citizens and virtually never allow him to visit a Soviet home.¹¹

Soviet sources for their part speak of freedom and democracy in their country and paint a glowing picture of successes in all fields. Of course, Communists have said that freedom is "understanding the necessary"¹² and that "democracy is only for those who follow the socialist course."¹³ With this understanding, coupled with the discussion on Communist qualifications concerning "truth" above, one might be hesitant to take Soviet publications' evaluations at face value.

Nevertheless, reliable information is available. In fact, the above discussion on punishment alone reveals that persons are not adhering to "socialist morality." (These persons are in turn deprived of their socialist freedom and democracy.) In addition, whether they want to admit social deviations or not, the Soviet government and its agencies must communicate with each other. They cannot allow social problems, for example, to go unstudied and unchecked because of the fear of a "security" leak.

Therefore, information is available which may be interpreted to determine the possible effects of Soviet indoctrination.

Occasionally, actual tests of Soviet youth behavior are available. Uri Bronfenbrenner's book, already cited numerous times, provides valuable first-hand test results. One of the most interesting of his results was taken from data comparing test results taken by youth in the West (United States, United Kingdom, and West Germany) and in the Soviet Union.

The tests were administered with the object of having the youth commit anti-social behavior, in this case, cheating on a test. There were three conditions under which the test was administered. The first condition was that the results of the test were secret. Only those taking the test would know the results. The second was that the peers of those

taking the test would be informed of the results. The third testing condition was that the results would be shown to adults.

Soviet children showed avoidance of anti-social behavior in the test where the peers would be allowed to view the results. In the condition where the adults would see the results, the Soviet youth were more apt to cheat. American children committed more anti-social acts under the peer condition than in the other two conditions.

The closer the Soviet youth who were taking the test were to social control, like in boarding schools, the less deviant they were. Soviet children showed a marked tendency to correct each other before bringing group or adult pressure to bear. Virtually no Soviet child claimed to be indifferent to deviant behavior or have the attitude of "It does not concern me."¹⁴

The experiments above reveal that group pressure can make a person make judgments which are known and perceived to be erroneous ones. In the Soviet group, these decisions increased in conformity if a group attitude was instilled. Apparently it is relatively easy for authority to hold sway over Soviet children, and it follows reason that this control carries over to the adult too.

Bronfenbrenner considers that proper Soviet youth behavior should not be solely considered to be a product of Soviet education and discipline. He argues that a more allusively detectable social practice contributes to Soviet conformity. Specifically, he refers to the "constricting mother-child relationship." He says that it produces a conforming dependent personality. This is because the child will conform to receive the love that he received as a young child. Soviet mothers lavish affection and then discipline their children by withholding

affection.¹⁵

The Soviets would be pleased with the results of Bronfenbrenner's tests. In 1970 the first secretary of the Komsomol said that Soviet youth are on the "right track." However, some problems were revealed when he said that the youth should not tolerate "some appearances of skepticism, apolitical behavior, a scornful attitude toward work, study, school, or civil obligation."¹⁶

The area where youth problems seem to be most unacceptable to the Soviets is in personal or individual discipline. The Soviets' social controls appear to work well enough in group activities, on the job, in school, at play, etc., but when a Soviet citizen is alone or when certain personal habits are basically beyond group or social control per se, there seems to be pronounced problems.

Soviet youth have no significant drug problem but alcoholism and drunkenness are widespread.¹⁷ This problem is extremely difficult to cope with since alcoholic overuse is a deeply ingrained socially accepted practice. Forty per cent of minors who come to trial committed their crimes while intoxicated.¹⁸ There are increasing reports of juvenile delinquency, crime, and retarded social maturity.¹⁹

There is an unwillingness lately to submit personal desires to collective welfare. This is an ideological crime and by far of more concern to the Soviets than traditionally defined felonies.²⁰ One area where weaknesses in "collective spirit" appear is in persons' attitudes toward the national voluntary work day. The Subbotniks, as they are called, are supposed to be a time of working with no pay on certain tasks assigned by the state, such as picking up trash in parks, etc.

The response to propagandized virtues is greeted with apathy by the

average Soviet citizen. Research carried out in Ufa by a graduate student in 1970 showed the following concerning attitudes of youth toward work. The most common reason for taking work as an unskilled laborer was that circumstances prevented the person from doing otherwise. Workers aged 15-19 had the highest level of job turnover. Only 5.9 per cent of the unskilled workers interviewed participated in work for the public good.²¹ In fact, the middle class looks down on manual labor. Youth drift from job to job. The number of Komsomol workers on state farms halved in five years. In Moscow 65 per cent of job transients are under 30 years of age.²²

The various gaps in areas where the state needs workers is vexing but the Soviets have brought many of their problems on themselves. For instance, the farm sector, though it already utilizes a large labor force, needs more workers. But the Soviets drained the rural sector for years of both men and wealth. Now that the need for a strong rural sector has been realized, the state is trying to reeducate the populace in the benefits of the good rural life. However, the rural sector lags behind the standard of living of the urban sector. In addition, the favorable propaganda concerning the rural area has not been matched by an input of needed funds.²³ Most important, and a key to the theme here, is that mass values cannot be changed rapidly from the previously instilled ones. The state has for years glorified urban living to help move workers to the city. The people are resisting change. This relates directly to the impact of any long-term indoctrination effort, i.e. the difficulty of change.

The Soviets are trying to teach their people that a person should be motivated by devotion to the revolution. The regime, however, is

relying more and more on incentives, since the workers are not responding as the ideology says they should.²⁴ Soviet indoctrination has not cultivated a spirit of sacrifice for the revolution nor have the people grown to love work so much that they will work for the fun of it.

One citizen said, "Everyone is full of fine words about how we must live for the common cause, for happiness, for the future. But what good is the future for me. I just want to live . . . not for the future but now, in the present."²⁵

A more serious problem (especially from an ideological standpoint) is unemployment. There is, as should be expected in any society, ordinary laziness and the chronically unemployed. Unemployment is hotly denied in the Soviet Union, however, because of the ideological implications in a society where everyone is supposed to be working for the love of labor.

The fact that unemployment exists is acknowledged by the Soviets' attempt to deal with it. They refer to unemployment as "idling" or bezdelnichestvo. Kassof describes the problem as "rejection of the production ethic." This ethic is a central theme in the youth program. Labor and production per se are supposed to be positive values and each Soviet citizen is obliged to undergo disciplined, self-imposed denial in the interest of Communist construction.²⁶ Kassof states further that rejection, as such, of the production ethic is made by only a small minority.

The Soviets have attempted to counter unemployment by making it illegal. On May 4, 1961 a law "For Intensification of the Campaign Against Persons Shirking Socially-Useful Labor and Leading a Parasitical Way of Life" was passed. The penalty was forced labor for 2-5 years with

confiscation of property and no appeal.²⁷ The Komsomolites are utilized to bring those who are unemployed to public notice.²⁸

Another problem for the Soviets is a creeping desire for leisure and the good life. Moscow's fashionable Gorky Street is sometimes called "Broadway" by Soviet youth. A small number of foppish zootsuiters now style themselves in an overdone and often ignorant way to Western fad styles. They are called stilyagi. They even adopt English nicknames and American slang. There seems to be a natural tendency in a society, which is breaking from the little-luxuried past into a comfortable industrially developed and potentially wealthy present, to indulge in extremes and fads. Those persons so inclined waste their money on gaudy displays of their material wealth.²⁹

A cause of stilyagi and other deviations may be a result of the fact that there is no distinct youth culture in the Soviet Union. These few deviants break away deliberately in order to disassociate from the conventional morality. They are unable to form "new groups" and must, therefore, depend on independent activities.

The leadership does not really solve the problem when it identifies innocent curiosity with the sins of personal immorality and political wavering or disloyalty. They do not sort out the superficial from the serious, and this can only make its task and that of the youth program more difficult. Nevertheless, the line is advanced that long hair, bright apparel, and the wearing of "foreign" patches on clothing are a threat to society because they are a step toward adopting foreign ideas. (Some youth responded by asking the government to allow the production of more popular attractive domestic wares.)³⁰ The Party is never to blame for shortcomings in indoctrination of social problems. The family and

the schools are at fault.³¹

The question arises as to who are those who have surplus funds to squander on anything. Professionally qualified dancers, musicians, and athletes, as well as scientists and highly trained and important industrial managers receive good wages. However, the true elites are the Party members.³²

The problem of the growth of a class of Party elite would naturally have the effect of hypocrisy. It is difficult to imagine any ideological justification for it.

Combined with a credibility gap between some of the youth and the government, or the "we" "they" attitude, there is also a lack of identity between the youth and their elders. The attempts to bridge this gap have been discussed above.

The contradictions in the system are further deepened by the skepticism which may arise when the youth confront the rigidity of the system, especially in its insistence on inflexible controls.

Insulation from alternative life styles would naturally be the biggest fear of the Kremlin and, as evidenced by comments above, a significant reason for the government to restrict access to foreign information. If Soviet youth accept and believe the required truths, they become prone not to doubt or be discontented. This uncritical acceptance sets them up for a disillusioning tumble should they be confronted with irrefutable contradictory truths. Caution and cynicism might set in, which could cause the individual to reject the entire system, or at least foster a resistance to loyalty.

The youth have seen problems, such as instability in the Communist system. Stalin's death and Khrushchev's ouster made the leaders look

less than infallible. This is a potentially dangerous development for the Soviets, since the leaders are associated with the infallibility of the Party. One need only recall the situation which developed in East Europe in 1953 (East Germany), 1956 (Poland and Hungary), and 1968 (Czechoslovakia) to appreciate the potential for explosion there should the Party's hold slip.³³

In interpreting Soviet youth behavior there seems to be little material or basis for questioning the basic allegiance of the youth to their government or way of life.

The revolution occurred nearly 60 years ago. Several generations have matured under Soviet indoctrination. Problems that exist seem to be less indicative of social ferment and more a result of a growing and advancing society.

The Soviets themselves are approaching deviation with less reaction characteristic of the Stalinist days. Soviet theories on criminology, however, remain somewhat dominated by the social-deterministic approach. That is, they point the finger of blame for social problems on bourgeois survivals and institutional malfunctions in the family.³⁴ Soviet social science basically involves turning out statements which will lead to Party established truths and conclusions. Social studies are encumbered with political dogmatic conclusions.

If the Soviets are to meet their problems squarely and cope with them instead of passing the buck as it were, they will have to show fundamental changes in their attitude. A recent round-table conference in 1973 examined shortcomings in social science instruction at higher education institutions. The subjects being taught, it was said, were not having any educational effect.³⁵

Several recent articles have proposed greater use of sociology and social psychology in coping with teenage crime rather than recommending action by the Communist Party or its youth arm, the Komsomol. The shift seems to suggest a growing emphasis on a pragmatic rather than ideological analysis of the problem.³⁶

The Soviets are beginning to show more flexibility toward popular information in their media. They realize the numbing effect that continuous propaganda has on the citizenry. The public wants to get practical information; therefore, it turns to foreign broadcasts for facts and entertainment. The Soviet government recognizes this problem and some changes are coming about. There is now apolitical entertainment with political messages thrown in. It is not easy to remedy the growing disinterest, however.³⁷

Some Soviet films of military exploits in the last decade have been more humane and realistic. At the same time they have been banned in China as being "likely to undermine the morale of the masses in the fight against the imperialists."³⁸

There have been some indications of a more democratic approach in certain organizations. For example, a 1962 amendment in the Komsomol rules allowed discussion and the proposal from the floor of resolutions.³⁹

The planners are apprehensive about anticipated boredom that they may encounter. They called on education and sports organizations to generate sincere enthusiasm and dispel fears among the young that they may have to endure dry, abstract lectures. Komsomolites say that they are offering lessons, not a lecture, just a lively chat, free of restraint, emotional involvement. A cordial, confidential tone is especially important.⁴⁰

There is a fear that youth may not submit to the channeling of its emotions. While on the other hand, "Concessions to a younger generation, less fearful and less reserved than its thoroughly terrorized predecessors, might lead to an unmanageable situation."⁴¹

In 1972 and 1973 several of the official Party slogans revealed some interesting ideological alterations.⁴² Soviet writers and artists were no longer required to use "all their energies and capabilities" to educate builders of Communism but instead only their "capabilities."⁴³ The slogan which was addressed to Soviet teachers or "education workers" had been completely rewritten. The change of this slogan may be viewed as tending to deemphasize the political-ideological education in Soviet schools. It is one thing to demand the improvement of the "matter of Communist education" and quite a different thing to insist on education of youths "in the spirit of Communist morality" as the altered slogan read.⁴⁴

"Communist education" would normally be understood as referring to the range of subjects from the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to dialectical materialism. This is known in the U.S.S.R. by the generic term "polit-training." An education "in the spirit of Communist morality," on the other hand, merely requires youths to be taught to observe the rules of "Communist morality" which has little to do with the teaching of the formal ideological discipline. The slogan did not refer specifically to grammar school teachers. They might be supposed to be free to educate their pupils as they see fit, without specific instructions from the Communist Party's Central Committee (at least in theory).

The May Day slogans of 1975 did not emphasize ideological training

but stressed factors related to production and the economy. Teachers were called upon to improve the quality of instruction and to improve the training of cadres for the national economy. Youth are to be imbued with a conscientious attitude toward studies and labor.⁴⁵

There was a hint of reprimand of an ideological nature in the May Day slogan addressed to artists, writers and other "cultural workers." These persons were to devote their capabilities to the upbringing of active builders of Communism. The inclusion of the word "active" is interpreted by one Western observer to insinuate that passivity regarding socialist content or among those "building Communism" may be a problem worthy of note.⁴⁶

None of the alterations insinuate the abandonment of the goal of Communism. Their intensive education program and total control have so far allowed them to make the above changes without losing control or abandoning a general movement toward the goal of Communism.

The slant given in the indoctrination program is the significant factor in molding social attitudes. Ideology has been misshapen considerably so that its place in society may be somewhat incidental compared to the long-range effect of militaristic upbringing per se. Generally, Soviet policy and attitude may be somewhat "cast" and perhaps unaffected by the fact that ideology may become clouded or even effectively and permanently set aside, at least as it concerns certain economic applications. In March 1975 Pravda called on the appropriate personnel to instill "truly militant qualities" into the Soviet media.⁴⁷ This theme seems to run consistently throughout Soviet development and has been reemphasized in recent years.⁴⁸

The Soviet youth program, even though it does not always accomplish

its purposes, colors and conditions the entire atmosphere in which young people grow to maturity.⁴⁹ There is no substantial evidence that the Soviet Russian youth have not positively been influenced by that program.⁵⁰

CHAPTER VI

DETENTE VERSUS MILITARISTIC INDOCTRINATION "WHICH WILL PREVAIL?"

It is doubtful whether any person on this earth could predict the ultimate outcome of Soviet policies or the outcome of the policies of any nation. The title "which will prevail?" admittedly implies that the question of Soviet developments is strictly dichotomous.¹ Indeed, if the leaders in the Kremlin could be sure that detente and their indoctrination program were the only factors influencing their development they would be happy men indeed. Nevertheless, it will be argued below that detente and the content of indoctrination may be two important forces acting on the Soviet youth. The effects of these forces may differ from the ones intended by the Soviet leaders.

The indoctrination program has been shown to consist of a huge coordinated program of sensory inputs. These inputs go together to present a line which is formulated by a central authority consisting of a handful of powerful elitist rulers who jealously guard their position. In fact, the line itself may serve in part to maintain the status quo politically. The line emanates from the form of physical structures, the content of works of art, the media, education, entertainment, sports activities, ad nauseam.

The message contained in the line is that man is drawn by the forces of history toward a communal or communist society where no classes exist. Thus, there will be no social forms or modes of production to oppress man. The road to communism is fraught with struggle because the former ruling class does not give up its position easily. Therefore, in order to build

the conditions for communism both socially (the New Soviet Man) and materially (an economy of abundance) the workers, led by the Communist Party, join together in the socialist state. In this historical stage they build the basis for communism and struggle against reactionary forces. The struggle or battle against the various enemies of socialism becomes an overall theme of the indoctrination program. Even cooperation with the enemy may in the long run enhance the struggle against him. The Communist Party possesses infallible knowledge as to what is right and where lies the correct path to communism.² The formula is hypnotic to millions. It proclaims the inevitability of a glorious Utopia someday.

Whereas struggle is justified because it supposedly must mark the transition between stages of social development there is a basic contradiction with the notion of inevitability. If the victory of communism is inevitable why must the heart of the revolution, the Soviet Union and the role of the party be protected at all costs?

The Soviet citizenry at any rate is being trained in military skills and the Soviet armed forces are being enlarged at a tremendous rate.³ The growth of the Soviet military, which significantly outstrips U.S. military growth, may bode ill for future world peace.⁴ The combination of growing military imbalance between the United States and the Soviet Union and the militaristic content of the Soviet indoctrination program should at least give one cause for alarm.

Where does detente, or peaceful coexistence as the Soviets call it, fit in? Does detente act in opposition to militaristic indoctrination? It would be too cumbersome and self-defeating to begin a discussion on all the ramifications of detente here. However, in relation to what has

been covered above concerning the growth and promulgation of Soviet military oriented indoctrination, it is appropriate to discuss detente as it affects the indoctrination program.

The Soviets are having problems building their economy, especially relative to the West's.⁵ This places the Soviets in a weak situation competitively with the West and generates restiveness at home. This restiveness is enhanced by the influx of information concerning better conditions which exist in the West. This information has ironically accompanied detente and contradicts information contained in the indoctrination program. The Kremlin's dilemma is worsened by the fact that they have been more or less forced to relax the Stalinist oppressiveness in order to enhance domestic incentive and productivity. This relaxation could allow any existing ferment to spread.

Domestic unrest in the Soviet Union must not be exaggerated, and interpretation of its meaning must be approached with caution. The main challenge, as it were, to the Soviet system is not a native desire to overturn things and set up private ownership, etc., but a desire on the part of certain interest groups at least⁷ to have a voice in state dealings.⁶ If, however, the party allows others to have a say in state policies, which would basically amount to democratic socialism, the party would be surrendering its leading role.⁷

The Soviets are also vexed by the desire for better living conditions and material wealth of their citizenry. This makes for demands on the Soviet budget in addition to the burdensome allocations for the building of communism.

Detente basically serves to take some of the economic and technological developmental pressures off the Soviet government through trade

with the more prosperous West.⁸ Certainly the Soviets would be hard pressed to follow their military plans and appease their citizenry from their own budget alone. Detente somewhat satisfies both demands.

Detente does carry with it certain unwanted baggage. These are factors which undermine Soviet indoctrination.

True communists are not going to abandon communism in exchange for the technology and credits they believe are needed to build the Soviet Union the way they want it. But they confidently expect their leaders, and the United States as well, to provide the stability that will make this building easier. That's what detente means to them.⁹

Regardless of communist resolve not to abandon ideology, Soviet sources reveal the concern of the leadership for an uncontrollable weakening of ideology.¹⁰ The general Soviet line here is that the West must not expect political and ideological concessions in exchange for economic ties, etc., i.e. detente will be stringently administered at home.

Soviet citizens are instructed that detente is a new form of struggle against the enemies of socialism. "In view of the opposite social systems, different modes of production, property systems, and class interest, detente is a dialectical blend of cooperation and struggle."¹¹

Pravda in 1972 said that detente signifies not the cessation of class struggle between the two systems but only the disavowal of the use of military methods in this struggle.¹² Izvestia said that detente is a means toward changing the social and political status quo in the world to the advantage of communism. "Those who ignore this reality should be put in a cage and exhibited alongside the Australian Kangaroo."¹³

Thus, while persons in the West may consider that detente means

convergence with the Soviets or a mellowing of Soviet resolve, an examination of Soviet prophetizations reveals that the Soviets are still actively working for the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism, especially with skillful and diverse methods of diplomacy, i.e. detente.¹⁴

Detente may be seen as a triple edged sword. It obtains for the Soviets the import of technology that they need, a peace image is established to rebuild a tattered Soviet image, plus a hesitancy is cultivated among Western powers to act or disrupt the apple cart. In addition, detente acts as a shield, a defense against turmoil on her borders, at least not on two fronts.

Leon Goure expressed a logical observation concerning the apparent contradiction between detente and Soviet militaristic indoctrination. He said:

However much the climate of detente has seemed to ameliorate Soviet-American relations over the past few years, one wonders whether the training that the Soviet leadership considers essential for its young people does not more accurately reflect Moscow's true estimate of the prospect for a lasting reconciliation.¹⁵

Detente in no way need be interpreted as a contradiction to military preparedness in so far as it is apparently intended to serve the Kremlin. One need only recall Lenin's concept of the "zigzag" course of the revolution to support this probability. Detente is not something which is in opposition to military plans but a tactic which enhances world stability and domestic development to the Soviets' pleasure. But in the realm of intentions and effects detente takes on an important light and may profoundly undermine Soviet indoctrination.

Detente has not been practiced over a long period of time. It has not been deeply imbedded through indoctrination into the Soviet citizens'

minds as have other party lines. It should be therefore relatively easy to change from detente to another policy if the need arose. It is the erosive effect of contradictory inputs that should concern the Kremlin, and it does.

Melvin Laird wrote in 1974 that the test of detente should include the following:

1. There should be basic and open communications between the United States and the Soviet Union.
2. There should be tangible mutual benefits in trade and other commercial exchanges [so as not to give the Soviets technology with nothing as important to the United States in return.]
3. There should be real and observable evidence of significant reductions or limitations in military spending and the deployment of strategic weapons.¹⁶

What Laird proposed are concrete deeds instead of noncommittal words. The Soviets in turn realize the implications that these moves would have on their control. Indication of their concern may be deduced from the negative reaction of the Soviets to such relaxations as Laird proposed. So far, the overall effect of the Soviet program is positive. The Soviet leaders want to keep it that way.

The Kremlin has little to fear from the present generation. The Soviet youth has better discipline, personal appearance, and study habits than his peers in the West. He also makes a better attempt at participating in social activities. The Soviet youth is essentially patriotic and loyal to the Soviet system.¹⁷ Most of them are unusually outspoken and well informed for a society that still strives to restrict closely the quantity and quality of information provided its citizens. Soviet authorities seem willing to endure bourgeois subversion like rock and roll, and the clothes and manner of speech of Westerners, so long as the youth do not try to imitate the protest marches of their Western peers.¹⁸

Problems and shortcomings of the Soviet program are real but are not dangerous and should not be exaggerated. There are quite visible signs, however, that the spectrum of Soviet youth is wide. Some areas of the spectrum show cause for concern. In a popular Soviet movie, for example, four youths with the "approved" background kill another youth. The question of why is not raised. Moscow streets at night reveal long-haired youth, rises in juvenile delinquency, evidence of vandalism, materialism and lost tradition with the revolutionary past.¹⁹ Soviet youth are outwardly clean and neat but compared to other nations' youth they are less committed to telling the truth or seeking intellectual understanding. They rarely show aggressiveness.²⁰ The Soviet citizen is a product of extreme politicization of social control which plays its most important role in their youth.

Abuses of authoritarian control may themselves have nurtured a potential for trouble. We must not, however, assume that the abuses of state power that have taken place have had an overall negative effect. To do so may lead us both to misunderstand the appeal of the communist system and to underrate its potential for survival.²¹ On the other hand, the inherent drawbacks of an authoritarian system cannot be ignored. Certainly the minus at least partially offsets the plus.

Excessive bureaucratization, exclusion of the masses from responsible decision-making, and sometimes even from political participation can result in consequences of boredom, indifference, and resentment due to the invasion of privacy. The Soviets' demand for obedience has been at the cost of imagination and productive innovation. On top of this, the indoctrination processes are being undermined by realities. Furthermore, there may be the possibility that a degree of the loyalty shown, at least

by the older citizens, to the regime may be somewhat a product of social adjustment by the populace in order to survive comfortably. The proponents of the system, given the central control available, may prevail far out of proportion to popular feeling.

There are enough indications, such as widespread alcoholism and worker indifference, to evidence a potential discontent. Even devout Marxists, at least in Eastern Europe, have called for socialism with a human face. Detente could serve to trigger a chain reaction of discontent.²² This is an important alternative to the intended effect of detente.

Speculation must also be raised as to the effect of the indoctrination program in spite of abuses and contradictions. It is entirely feasible, and evidence seems to confirm the fact, that through the many years of deliberate indoctrination the Soviets have successfully fertilized the seeds of militancy and devotion to revolution. Perhaps the program will reap more success than intended.

The Politburo today is comprised of older men, men in their seventies.²³ This generation has generally acted conservatively, especially in regard to military matters. The use of military might in Czechoslovakia in 1968 was reasonably predictable and explainable in terms of basic imperatives of Soviet control and the role of the party. Khrushchev, who preceded the present leadership, did not give the atom bomb to a bellicose China who may have used it. In all probability, the immediate successors to Brezhnev will act within the same framework as their predecessors, in the spirit of detente. The behavior of future Soviet generations, on the other hand, may be more passionate, bellicose and impatient-- a product of the years of indoctrination.

A highly nationalistic and militaristic populace which is willing to continue a relatively austere life in order to lavish money on large scale military expenditures appears to be a primary goal of the indoctrination program. Since the Soviet citizenry appears to follow such a pattern, the indoctrination program would seem to be a success.

But rampant nationalism and xenophobia coupled with military adventurism could spark a war that would realize the worst Russian fears of renewed suffering and would destroy the Soviet Union as the base of the communist revolution, if not totally destroying the Soviet people.

If the Soviets are to continue their present military growth they may have to widen certain ideologically defined economic parameters. Alteration of the economic basis of their ideology significantly degrades it because Marxism is fundamentally an economic philosophy.

Whatever the ideological resultant is from current pressures, the indoctrination program has made its mark. Perhaps a new Russian or Soviet imperialism is in the making, to be clothed only lightly in Marxist-Leninist trappings. Time alone will reveal whether the incidental effects of detente will erode the foundations of the New Soviet Man or whether the militaristic content of indoctrination will prevail, or whether neither will have a significant effect. Perhaps it is a contest between the desire of man for material "at hand" rewards and the incessant far-reaching application of demands of struggling for future rewards. History has given little indication that the masses have much of a mind for tomorrow, nor that they are willing to make sacrifices for tomorrow's goals. But the past has also seen societies which were developing a more and more comfortable standard of living throw all of their advancements aside in favor of the alluring thrill of expansionism and war.

PREFACE NOTES

¹Bernard Gwertzman, "Brezhnev Compares Unrest of Youth in West with Calm in Soviet," New York Times, May 27, 1970, p. 2.

²Ibid. & "Komsomol Congress," New York Times, May 31, 1970, Section 4, p. 6.

³Donald P. Myers, "Average 13-year-old Not What He Used To Be," South Bend Tribune, Sunday, May 4, 1975, p. 24. See also "Vandalism, A Billion Dollars A Year And Getting Worse," U.S. News & World Report, June 24, 1974, pp. 39-41 and "Vandalism in Schools," Chicago Tribune, Sunday, August 18, 1974, Section 2, p. 4.

⁴"Extortion in British Schools," South Bend Tribune, Thursday, April 3, 1975, p. 4.

⁵Donald Kirk, "'Near Accidents' Fun At 100 m.p.h.," Chicago Tribune, Sunday, August 4, 1974, Section 1, p. 28.

⁶Howard Flieger, "Schools Out--Far Out," U.S. News & World Report, July 1, 1974, p. 72.

⁷"Drive For Rights of Children," U.S. News & World Report, August 5, 1974, pp. 42-44.

⁸U.S. News & World Report, January 27, 1975, p. 31.

⁹Albert Bandura, Social Learning Theory, Morristown, N. J., General Learning Press, 1971, p. 21.

¹⁰See Patricia McCormack, "Street Code Enforced at Brigham Young University," South Bend Tribune, Sunday, November 17, 1974, p. S3. "Moderate behavior" is valued differently according to various schools of thought but spirit, acquisition of knowledge and motivation are generally universally acclaimed virtues.

¹¹Herbert Goldhamer, The Soviet Union in a Period of Strategic Parity, Santa Monica, RAND, November 1971, p. 3.

¹²The topic of the validity of Soviet sources in general is widely examined. See Robert Conquest, Power and Policy in the U.S.S.R.: The Struggle for Stalin's Succession 1945-1960, New York, Harper Torchbooks, 1967, for a study in "Kremlinology." See also David Bell, "Ten Theories in Search of Reality," World Politics, April 1958, pp. 327-365; Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, "Buddha's Smile," The First Circle, trans. Thomas P. Whitney, New York, Bantam Books 1972; Robert Conquest, "The Moscow Correspondent: A Comment," Survey, October 1968, pp. 122-124; and Michael Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1964.

CHAPTER I NOTES

¹F. C. Neff, Webster's 3rd New International Dictionary, 1966,
p. 1153.

²Allen Kassof, The Soviet Youth Program: Regimentation and
Rebellion, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1965, pp. 30-31, 35,
37, 38, 47, and 97.

³J. J. Schwartz, "The Elusive 'New Soviet Man,'" Problems of
Communism, September-October, 1973, p. 41.

CHAPTER II NOTES

¹ Harold Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna/A Study in Allied Unity: 1812-1822, title page.

² John S. Reshetar, Jr., "Soviet Political Culture and the Russian Political Tradition," The Soviet Polity, New York, Dodd, Mead & Co., 1972, & George A. Brinkley, Jr., "Soviet Internal Affairs" (lectures given at the University of Notre Dame, 1973).

³ However, until Ivan III consolidated the Muscovite Russ there was a period when separate princes paid tribute to the foreign Khans.

⁴ This extreme centralization, militarization and the consolidation of borders did not mean that alien alliances could not occur.

⁵ Basically, these amount to those factors which influence their total control or position of power. The Soviet regime has been described as a self-perpetuating bureaucracy whose principal aim is to keep itself in power. See Brian Crozier, ed., The Peacetime Strategy of the Soviet Union, Institute for the Study of Conflict, February-March, 1973. "Debate and discord in the inner circles of the Party are probably as intensive as that found in the decision-making circles of any government, though they are not aired publicly. The range of possible alternatives is limited by ideology, but we do not know how stringently or how loosely any faction adheres to accepted doctrine to formulate its position, or to what degree naked power considerations and personality factors affect these calculations." Alvin Z. Rubinstein, ed., The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union, 3rd ed., New York, Random House, 1972, p. 16.

⁶ Waldemar Gurian, The Rise and Decline of Marxism, trans. E. F. Peeler, London, Burns, Oates, & Washbourne, Ltd., 1938, p. 50.

⁷ Robert A. Scalapino, "Patterns of Asian Communism," Problems of Communism, January-April, 1971, vol. XX, pp. 10-11. More on this specifically below.

⁸ Crozier, "Peacetime Strategy," p. 65.

⁹ William E. Odom, "The Party Connection," Problems of Communism, September-October, 1973, p. 16.

¹⁰ Robert V. Daniels, The Nature of Communism, New York, Random House, 1962, pp. 144-145.

¹¹ See A.J.P. Taylor, From Sarajevo to Potsdam, London, Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1965, Chapters 1 and 2 for a somewhat graphic portrayal of the shattering sociological effect of World War I. See also Roger Martin DuGard, Jean Barois, trans. Stuart Gilbert, New York, Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1969 and Stefan Zweig, The World of Yesterday.

Lincoln, Nebraska, University of Nebraska Press, 1971. The nationalism which arose during World War I dismayed Lenin and "betrayed" Marxist logic. "When [WWI] broke out in 1914 it became clear that the International lacked plans or organization that could work, and the majority of the 'comrades' supported not internationalism but their bellicose fatherlands. The catastrophe of the 2nd International, like the First World War itself was a grievous blow to tolerance and democracy in Western civilization. The fiasco gave dogmatic, authoritarian Marxists like Lenin a matchless opportunity to associate 'revisionism' and the whole of democratic socialism with 'betrayal' of the interests of the masses." Robert H. McNeal, ed., International Relations Among Communists, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967, p. 7.

A contemporary "New Leftist," Murray Bookchin, explains that the non-revolutionariness of the European working class was a result of the fact that they were "proletarianized" psychically by the industrial system. He says that truly revolutionary persons come from those elements of society which are in a social transition, i.e. the jobless, the youth or, as he admiringly describes it, a person who has become totally "degenerate." Bookchin continues to describe the contemporary situation in the West which he describes as being "encouraging" from his revolutionary point of view. "The most promising development in the factories today is the emergence of young workers who smoke pot, [goof] off on their jobs, drift into and out of factories, grow long or longish hair, demand more leisure time rather than more pay, steal, harass all authority figures, go on wildcats, and turn on their fellow workers. Even more promising is the emergence of this human type in trade schools and high schools, the reservoir of the industrial working class to come." Murray Bookchin, "Listen Marxists," "All We Are Saying: The Philosophy of the New Left, Arthur Lothstein, ed., New York, Capricorn Books, 1971, p. 105. For another contemporary viewpoint of Marxist elements in today's students see Lewis S. Feuer, "Alienation: The Marxism of Student Movements," The Conflict of Generations: The Character and Significance of Student Movements, New York, Basic Books, Inc., 1969.

¹² See Philip Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: A Study of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics, 1st ed., Rand, New York, McGraw Hill Book Co., Inc., 1952.

¹³ See Thomas T. Hammond, "The History of Communist Takeovers," Studies on the Soviet Union: The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers, Robert Farrell, ed., Thomas T. Hammond, guest ed., Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R., Munich, new series, vol. XI, no. 4, 1971; Stephen D. Kertesz, The Fate of East Central Europe, Notre Dame, Indiana, University of Notre Dame Press, 1956; and Cyril E. Black and Thomas P. Thornton, Communism and Revolution: The Strategic Uses of Political Violence, Part I, Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1971 for examples, often from personal experience, of the application of this modern formula of subversion.

¹⁴ "Until the 'higher' phase of communism arrives, the socialists demand the strictest control by society and by the state over the measure of labor and the measure of consumption; but this control must start with the expropriation of the capitalists, with the establishment of workers'

control over the capitalists, and must be exercised not by a state of bureaucrats, but by a state of armed workers." V. I. Lenin, State and Revolution, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1972, p. 89. Emphasis in the original text.

¹⁵ Theodore H. Von Laue, Why Lenin, Why Stalin? Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1964, p. 225.

¹⁶ See Richard Pipes, International Negotiation; Some Operating Principles of Soviet Foreign Policy, January 10, 1972, Washington, D.C.

¹⁷ See Col. George W. Smith, U.S.M.C., "Clausewitz in the 1970's Rx for Dilemma," Military Review, July 1972, as printed in "The Changing Nature of War," National and Military Strategy, vol. IV, 7th ed., Air University Maxwell FB, Alabama, July 1972, pp. 29-33, and E. H. Carr, "The Marxist Attitude to War," The Bolshevik Revolution, vol. 3, Middlesex, England, Penguin Books, 1973.

¹⁸ Robert V. Daniels, The Nature of Communism, p. 144.

¹⁹ One must be careful to understand the Soviet's meaning for "peace." The word peace, like any key Soviet policy word, must not be taken at face value. Peace to the Soviets is not peace in the traditional sense and certainly not "peace at any price." In fact, the Soviets say that they must fight a great battle for peace. That peace is carefully qualified as being one which is "just" and "democratic." Information Bulletin, #9-10, 1974, p. 16.

²⁰ Max Reimann, "Peace, War, Revolution," World Marxist Review, vol. 17#8, August 1974, p. 3.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Christian Dueval, "War (By Proxy) Not Denounced by the U.S.S.R.," Radio Liberty Dispatch, January 15, 1974.

²³ Fedor A. Ryzhinko, "The Formation and Development of the Foreign Policy of the C.P.S.U.," Voprosy Istorii, #8, 1973, pp. 3-14.

²⁴ Pravda, June 15, 1972, as quoted in Goure, Military Indoctrination, p. 6.

²⁵ This point is extremely important and a salient feature of Soviet foreign policy. A threat to the Soviet Union is considered a threat to the world revolution. This rationale neatly serves Soviet hegemony in regard to world power and as claimant to the leading role in international communism. This theme is widely used in Soviet propaganda and indoctrination programs. See Tad Szulc, Czechoslovakia Since World War II, New York, Grosset & Dunlap, 1971, pp. 308, 390, and 452-455.

²⁶ Reimann, "Peace, War," p. 3.

²⁷ Gerhart Niemeyer, "The Role of Ideology in Communist Systems," Orbis, vol. XVII, #3, Fall 1973, p. 779.

²⁸ Oleg Penkovskiy, The Penkovskiy Papers, trans. Peter Lariabin, Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1965, p. 370 footnote.

²⁹ Richard F. Rosser, An Introduction to Soviet Foreign Policy, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall Inc., 1969, p. 59.

³⁰ Daniels, Nature of Communism, p. 148.

³¹ See Adam B. Ulam, "1917," The Bolsheviks: The Intellectual, Personal and Political History of the Triumph of Communism in Russia, New York, Collier Books, 1971.

³² Christian Dueval, "A High Ranking C.P.S.U., Official Corroborates Sakharov's Warning on Detente," Radio Liberty Dispatch, September 6, 1973.

³³ V. I. Lenin, Left Wing Communism, New York, International Publishers Co., Inc., 1940, p. 77.

³⁴ See Black and Thornton, Communism and Revolution, p. 437.

³⁵ Lenin, Left Wing Communism, p. 52.

CHAPTER III NOTES

¹ See Alfred G. Meyer, Communism, New York, Random House, 3rd ed., 1967, pp. 16-18.

² Karl Marx, The Communist Manifesto, introduction by A.J.P. Taylor, Baltimore, Maryland, Penguin Books, 1967, p. 105.

³ V. I. Lenin, State and Revolution, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1972, p. 87.

⁴ Ibid., p. 88. See also Meyer, Communism, pp. 90-91.

⁵ Basically, the various rationales for a state structure may be described as defining a socialist stage of the revolution. In this state activities would be devoted to the building of Communism and the smashing of the "capitalist encirclement" of the revolution. Only after these goals are reached could the state cease to exist. See George A. Brinkley, "Khrushchev Remembered: On the Theory of Soviet Statehood," Soviet Studies, vol. XXIV, #3, January 1973, p. 388. An important task which the Soviet state accomplishes is the preserving of the base of the revolution. See above.

⁶ One must not be too prone to accuse the Soviets of being absolutely pragmatic. Their own advancement as a world military and economic power has been frustrated by certain ideologically defined parameters within which their development has been confined. For example, the Communists had problems with their ideology concerning the development of computers. They feel strongly that the party knows all and knows what is best. Ultimate control must rest in the Party's hands.

The application of computers to military or economic planning would lead to "mathematical" solutions which would not be restricted to Marxist-Leninist goals. An arithmetic formula is not capable of determining a Marxist-Leninist view of the future. Its predictions are only as good as inputs into the formula. Marxist-Leninists alone are gifted with the ability to see the future.

The Soviets' fear for their loss of total control thus does not permit arithmetic formulas or natural forces to direct the operation of market and price functions in their economy.

In regard to military matters, however, the use of computers augments their control and the security of the Soviet Union. Thus, in this regard, ideology was reevaluated to allow computer use. Odom, "Party Connection," p. 14. See Milovan Djilas, The Unperfect Society: Beyond the New Class, New York, Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1969, Chapters 4 & 6.

Total control by the Party will theoretically not be needed when the people's consciousness (the New Soviet Man) is developed. This is a long-term prospect. The creation of class consciousness is a concurrent process with the building of other elements of Communism such as an economy of surplus. These elements are a prerequisite to the establishment of Communism.

⁷ Robert G. Kaiser, "The Baby in Russia: Tradition Reigns," Washington Post, Sunday, June 16, 1974, p. A16.

⁸ Marx, Communist Manifesto, pp. 100-101.

⁹ Von Laue, Why Lenin?, p. 158.

¹⁰ The Soviet wife today works five times as many hours weekly on household chores as her husband does, i.e. 45 to 50 hours, according to Communist, as reported by Mark Brayne, "Soviet wives still carrying the burden," Chicago Tribune, Sunday, January 12, 1975, p. 8 ("Perspective"). This work load is in addition to the time spent on jobs which many women have. The resultant heavy work load, which equals about 70 hours a week, plus the fact that child care facilities are limited, has caused a low birth rate, at least among Russians. Ibid.

The Soviets want the birth rate to increase in order to provide more workers for the development of the economy. Lynne Olson, "Facts of Married Life Withheld From Russian Youth," South Bend Tribune, Wednesday, March 12, 1975, p. 25. The average couple has 1 child whereas 2.3 children per couple are needed to build communism and maintain the population level. In addition, the average age of Soviet citizens is increasing and was 29.5 years in 1970. Also, the number of old people is growing, which adds to the problem of a shortage of labor. Lynne Olson, "Soviets Pushing Incentives to Spur New 'Baby Boom,'" South Bend Tribune, Sunday, December 29, 1974, p. 42. Ironically, there is widespread birth control which is carried out mainly through aborting pregnancies. In large cities 80 per cent of all pregnancies are aborted. Kaiser, "Baby in Russia," p. A1. Legal abortions, especially if performed on a Russian mother, are accompanied by lectures on the need to produce more babies. As an impetus to a greater birth rate, women are given medals for having numerous children. Mothers with over 10 children are awarded the title of "Heroine Mother" which ranks with military valor and labor success among the three activities given top honors in the U.S.S.R. Olson, "Soviets Pushing Incentives," p. 42. These developments certainly reflect "poorly" on the consciousness of the citizens to joyfully contribute to the building of communism.

¹¹ Since the early Soviet years only state marriages have been allowed. Ceremonies as such were non-existent. Basically, the couple simply signed their names to a document. No witnesses were required. The state would support the children of adults who could not do so. There was no stigma concerning illegitimate children. The Bolsheviks wanted to remove that humiliation from a child. In Moscow today, however, some couples pay up to \$1400 for their wedding. In the Ukraine some weddings are costing up to \$7000! This trend toward more and more lavish weddings began in 1959 when the state permitted a simple "solemn" wedding ceremony. Lynne Olson, "Russians Share American Horror of Wedding Costs," South Bend Tribune, May 11, 1975, p. 9.

¹² Olson, "Facts of Married Life," p. 25.

¹³ Uri Bronfenbrenner, Two Worlds of Childhood; U.S. & U.S.S.R., New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1970, pp. 82-83.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 83.

¹⁵ Kassof, Soviet Youth Program, p. 165.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 185.

¹⁷ Bronfenbrenner, Two Worlds, p. 84.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 4. As seen above, some Soviet parents actively seek to place their children in some sort of upbringing collectives. A basic reason seems to be to allow the women more time to relax between their housework and job. According to Bronfenbrenner, at least by 1968, no teaching manual reflected a solution to collective upbringing producing a sound individual, and in fact, tended to produce more of a faceless conforming "yesman." (Makarenko was a pioneer in disciplinary techniques.)

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 90.

²⁰ Harold G. Noah, "Communist Schooling," Problems of Communism, September-October, 1973, Vol. XXII, p. 73.

²¹ Kassof, Soviet Youth Program, p. 94.

²² Wasyl Shmoniak, Communist Education: Its History, Philosophy and Politics, Chicago, Rand McNally, 1970, as reported in Problems of Communism, September-October, 1973, Vol. XXII, p. 72. Lenin wrote the following about the budding Soviet education system: "If we do not work too hurriedly we shall within a few years have a large number of young people who will be capable of radically changing our apparatus." He was specifically referring to the need to train people to control bourgeois professionals who were working at their old jobs in the new Soviet state. The problem was that the Soviet bureaucracy was not large or well trained enough to control these bourgeois workers. V. I. Lenin, "Five Years of the Russian Revolution and the Prospects of the World Revolution," Selected Works, Vol. X, pp. 330-331, as quoted in Waldemar Gurian, Bolshevism: An Introduction to Soviet Communism, Notre Dame, Indiana, University of Notre Dame Press, 1963, p. 139. Gurian has collected a number of important quotes from Soviet documents concerning education and cultural policies (pp. 139-152) and statements concerning Russian nationalism and Soviet patriotism (pp. 152-157).

²³ Noah, "Communist Schooling," p. 73. In reference to history or contemporary events a Soviet citizen will probably receive a slanted picture or not receive any information at all. See "Here's World War II in Soviet Terms," South Bend Tribune, Thursday, January 16, 1975, p. 8, Michael McGuire, "A Soviet View," Chicago Tribune, Sunday, October 28, 1973, and "Television's Grip on the Globe," Chicago Tribune, Sunday, July 7, 1974, Section 2, p. 8. Propaganda and censorship will be discussed further below.

²⁴ See V. I. Lenin, "The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government," Selected Works, Vol. VII and Ralph Talcott Fisher, Jr., Pattern for Soviet Youth: A Study of the Congresses of the Komsomol, 1918-1954, New York, Columbia University Press, 1959, p. 71.

²⁵Fisher, Pattern, p. 285.

²⁶"Reasons for High University Drop-Out Rate Discussed," Radio Liberty Dispatch, September 3, 1965.

²⁷Leon Goure, The Military Indoctrination of Soviet Youth, New York National Strategy Information Center, Inc., 1973, p. 14.

²⁸Ibid., p. 15.

²⁹Ibid., p. 14.

³⁰Ibid., p. 15.

³¹Ibid.

³²Fisher, Pattern, p. 241.

³³Ibid.

³⁴Goure, Military Indoctrination, p. 16.

³⁵Ibid., p. 18.

³⁶Ibid., p. 19.

³⁷The 1949 changes in the Komsomol By-laws reiterated that the role and responsibility of the Komsomol was to be a vehicle of Party directives. The chief thing in all the work of the Komsomol "is to insure the leadership of the Party." "Changes in the Komsomol By-laws," April 4, 1949 as recorded in Maisel & Kozera, eds., Materials for the Study of the Soviet System, 1953, pp. 423-424.

³⁸Article 126 of the 1936 "Stalin" Constitution, ibid., p. 263. This mentality which opposes independent group activity is carried through to Soviet criminal law which reads that crimes committed by groups are far more serious than those committed by individuals.

³⁹See Fisher, Pattern, p. 9.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 13.

⁴¹Kassof, Soviet Youth Program, p. 2.

⁴²Bronfenbrenner, Two Worlds, p. 11.

⁴³P. Y. Shelest said that Soviet authorities "should not put up with any fuzziness in dialogue or any grayness in literature and art," "Party Leaders Lash Out," New York Times, April 1, 1970, p. 3.

⁴⁴Goure, Military Indoctrination, p. 16.

⁴⁵ See Petr Kruzhin, "Youth and the Young Communist League," Youth in Ferment, Munich, Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R., July 1962 Series I, #66, pp. 75-82.

⁴⁶ Kassof, Soviet Youth Program, p. 171.

CHAPTER IV NOTES

¹Goure, Military Indoctrination, p. 17.

²The Party tries to imbue him with a sense of responsibility for state affairs. Students are also given a high degree of responsibility in university affairs. They also participate actively in trade unions and local government bodies.

³Goure, Military Indoctrination, p. 20.

⁴Bronfenbrenner, Two Worlds, p. 30.

⁵Ibid.

⁶"Worried About Delinquency, Soviet Boss Urges Dialogue," Christian Science Monitor, April 10, 1973, p. 4, Western edition.

⁷Bronfenbrenner, Two Worlds, p. 36.

⁸Ibid., p. 55.

⁹Ibid., p. 57.

¹⁰"Worried About Delinquency," Christian Science Monitor, p. 4.

¹¹Joseph Novak, The Future Is Ours, Comrade, New York, E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1964, p. 101.

¹²The row against row format of competition must be very effective. This writer witnessed an experiment on group competition where two opposing "sides" were determined arbitrarily. The entire group was a television studio audience. Thus, the group had nothing more in common than that they occupied the same room. Two well-known speakers on the stage instructed the group that one-half of the group was to identify itself with one speaker and the other half with the other speaker. The two speakers then began a dialogue of wits between each other, all the while eliciting support from "their" side. Soon, the group was behaving in an animated way. Each "side" was supporting "their" speaker's point of view with increasing frenzy!

¹³Kasuof, Soviet Youth Program, p. 38.

¹⁴Bronfenbrenner, Two Worlds, p. 62-63. The standard "TAT" consists of a picture or photograph. The examinee relates to the professionally trained examiner what the picture means to him. There should not be a right or wrong answer since the test is designed, in the United States at least, to reveal individual's character makeup.

¹⁵Schwartz, "Evasive 'New Soviet Man,'" p. 41.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 46.

¹⁷ In 1972 membership was 25,000,000, according to a figure given during a speech at a gathering of the All-Union Young Pioneer Organization. Current Digest of the Soviet Press (hereafter referred to as Current Digest), May 19, 1972, XXIV. A person may join as young as 8 years old and continue his membership to about age 15. Goure, Military Indoctrination, p. 16.

¹⁸ See the following articles which reflect the current "line" and actual status of religion in the Soviet Union: L. Gavrilov, "The Shadows Retreat," Pravda, June 2, 1972 as reported in Current Digest, June 2, 1972, XXIV; Michael McGuire, "God Is Not Dead in the Soviet Union," Chicago Tribune, Sunday, December 29, 1974, Section 2, pp. 1 and 8; "Russia Pack Churches," South Bend Tribune, Monday, May 5, 1975, p. 6; Yu. Safronov, "The Atheist's Authority," Izvestia, November 12, 1971, p. 3, as reported in Current Digest, November 12, 1971, XXIII.

¹⁹ Komsomol'skaya Pravda, January 21, 1971 as reported in Goure, Military Indoctrination, p. 21.

²⁰ Schwartz, "Elusive 'New Soviet Man,'" p. 50.

²¹ Goure, Military Indoctrination, p. 16.

²² Ibid., p. 20. The 24th Party Congress of the C.P.S.U. stressed the need for continuing education. After the 8 years of compulsory education (referred to as "incomplete secondary education"), there should be an opportunity to obtain a "complete secondary education." Three follow on programs were outlined by the Congress: 1) General education school, i.e. grades 9, 10, and 11; or 2) specialized secondary school or "technicum"; or 3) secondary vocational-technical school. V. Kochmasov, Pravda, July 4, 1972, p. 3 as reported in Current Digest, July 4, 1972, XXIV.

²³ Schwartz, "Elusive 'New Soviet Man,'" p. 44.

²⁴ Henry Werba, "Komsomol Check-up to be Preceded by Thorough Political Indoctrination of Youth," Radio Liberty Dispatch, October 24, 1966.

²⁵ World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations, Bureau of Intelligence & Research, U.S. Department of State, 1973, p. 58.

²⁶ Werba, "Komsomol Check-up."

²⁷ Schwartz, "Elusive 'New Soviet Man,'" p. 46.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 47.

²⁹ Kassof, Soviet Youth Program, p. 61.

³⁰ See Current Digest, June 27, 1971, 'XIII.

³¹ Fisher, Pattern, p. 48.

³² Ibid., p. 49.

³³ See Goure, Military Indoctrination, pp. 15-16, 18-19 & 26. DOSAAF also provides numerous clubs for post-military service activities and continuous training.

³⁴ William F. Scott, "Universal Military Service in the Soviet Union" (unpublished), January 1974, p. 7. This "permission" to play war is post-Khrushchevian. He would not allow the sale of militaristic toys.

³⁵ "Russian Psychiatrist Says Toy Guns Are O.K., If . . ." South Bend Tribune, Wednesday, December 4, 1974, p. 26.

³⁶ Goure, Military Indoctrination, p. 40. An augment to Pioneer aged children's military oriented activities is an organization called the Red Pathfinder Movement, which engages in visitations to former military sites. See pp. 32-33.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 42.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 45.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 29.

⁴⁰ Red Star, February 11, 1971 as quoted in Goure, Military Indoctrination, p. 31.

⁴¹ Goure, Military Indoctrination, p. 58.

⁴² Fisher, Pattern, p. 206.

⁴³ Tel'man Shamukov, "Combat on the Border," Radio Liberty Dispatch, August 13, 1960.

⁴⁴ See Goure, Military Indoctrination, pp. 20-21.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 47.

⁴⁶ The new men seem to be offensive oriented. The Pentagon says that the Soviets adopted the offensive strategy in 1956. "Younger Soviet Military," New York Times, April 23, 1973, p. 1.

⁴⁷ Drew Middleton, "Shortcomings in Training," New York Times, March 19, 1973, p. 10.

⁴⁸ Goure, Military Indoctrination, p. 69.

⁴⁹ Middleton, "Shortcomings," p. 10. See Harriet Fast Scott, "Educating the Soviet Officer Corps," Air Force Magazine, March 1975.

⁵⁰ "The Soviet Success at the 20th Olympic Games: Some Observations," Radio Liberty Dispatch, October 30, 1972.

51 "Russians Riddle Americans, 13-1," South Bend Tribune, Sunday, April 13, 1975, p. 60.

52 Goure, Military Indoctrination, pp. 48-49.

53 Ibid., p. 49.

54 Ibid., p. 1.

55 "Stepped Up Ideological Indoctrination of Students," Radio Liberty Dispatch, November 4, 1966.

56 Ibid.

57 "New Tasks, Old Problems in Soviet Education," Radio Liberty Dispatch, November 5, 1972.

58 Ibid.

59 Maj. General Vassily Zenskov, "Soviet Military Science," Soviet Union, #6 (243), 1970, p. 46.

60 Kassof, Soviet Youth Program, p. 175.

61 Goure, Military Indoctrination, p. 25.

62 "Stepped Up Ideological Indoctrination of Students," Radio Liberty Dispatch.

63 "Underground Journal," New York Times, January 4, 1973, p. 10. In 1969 KGB pressure forced the Chronicle to disappear. John Barron, "Russia's Voice of Dissent," Reader's Digest, May 1974, p. 143.

64 "Television's Grip," Chicago Tribune, Section 2, p. 8.

65 "Soviets Hungry For Good Books," South Bend Tribune, Sunday, February 9, 1975, p. 2.

CHAPTER V NOTES

¹ See Barzon, "Russia's Voice," pp. 139-143.

² "'Psychiatric Terror' of K.G.B. Described," South Bend Tribune, Sunday, March 2, 1975, p. 2.

³ "Tass Says 'Total Spying' Typical of U.S. Living," South Bend Tribune, Sunday, January 19, 1975, p. 6.

⁴ Nicholas Deniloff, "Detente's O.K., But Soviet Bars Liberalization of Internal Policy," South Bend Tribune, Sunday, December 8, 1974, p. 58.

⁵ George Kizer, "Russia Without Rhetoric," Chicago Tribune Magazine, July 28, 1974, p. 15.

⁶ "Komsomol Congress," New York Times, May 31, 1970, Section 4, p. 6.

⁷ "Dealing With Juvenile Delinquency," Soviet Union, #10 (247), 1970, p. 36.

⁸ "Worried About Delinquency," p. 4, Western edition.

⁹ Kizer, "Russia Without Rhetoric," pp. 16-17.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 16.

¹¹ "U.S. & Soviet 'Trade' in People is Growing," U.S. News & World Report, March 4, 1974, pp. 66-67.

¹² Translated from the German, "Freiheit ist Einsicht in die Notwendigkeit" as quoted in Arthur M. Hanhardt, Jr. "The Political System of the German Democratic Republic: Totalitarian, Authoritarian or What?" A paper prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Albuquerque, N. M., April 8-10, 1971, p. 17.

¹³ J. B. Tito to the Presidium of the Council, Yugoslav Trade Union Federation, 18 December, 1971 as quoted in Encounter, vol. XXXIX, #2, August 1972, p. 70.

¹⁴ Bronfenbrenner, Two Worlds, p. 80.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 14.

¹⁶ Gwertzman, "Brezhnev Compares," p. 2.

¹⁷ Bonnie Jezior, "Military Wives Visit Soviet Union," Air Force Times, April 30, 1975, p. F3.

¹⁸ "Worried About Delinquency," p. 4, Western edition.

¹⁹V. Komov, "They Wave Us Away," Izvestia, September 8, 1972 as reported in Current Digest, September 8, 1972, XXIV.

²⁰Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago 1918-1956: An Experiment in Literary Investigation, Parts I & II, trans. Thomas P. Whitney, New York, Harper & Row, 1973, p. 478.

²¹Current Digest, June 1972, XXV from an article in Molodoi Kommunist.

²²Schwartz, "Elusive 'New Soviet Man,'" p. 43.

²³Education programs themselves are lagging behind scientific and technical developments. Current Digest, June 1972, XXV.

²⁴Alfred C. Meyer, Leninism, New York, Praeger, 1972, pp. 23-24.

²⁵"Should Soviet Man Be Motivated By Revolutionary Service or Material Incentive," Radio Liberty Dispatch, October 24, 1966.

²⁶Kassof, Soviet Youth Program, p. 144.

²⁷Yuri Pisemny, "The Social 'Crimes' of Youth," Youth in Ferment, Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R., Munich, July 1962, Series I, #66, p. 91. Communists have tried the same approach of making unemployment a crime. Graana, March 28, 1971, Year 6 # 13, p. 5. The ideological implications of unemployment in a "worker's state" must not be ignored.

²⁸Kassof, Soviet Youth Program, p. 165.

²⁹A similar effect was displayed when "modernization" swept the West. Zootsuits, "modern" art and the infinite epistles to abstract philosophies flourished in the 1920s and 30s. See Taylor, From Sarajevo to Potsdam, pp. 100-117.

³⁰Current Digest, July 22, 1972, XXIV from an article in Schityelskaya Gazeta.

³¹Current Digest, November 1, 1972, XXIV from an article in Literaturnaya Gazeta.

³²See Milovan Djilas, The New Class, New York, Praeger, 1957.

³³This writer is not implying that unrest in East Europe may be assumed to indicate equal or similar unrest in the Soviet Union. In fact, it is unlikely that any youth unrest in the Soviet Union is potentially explosive at all. The instability in East Europe is a factor of nationalism and sovereignty in the face of Soviet hegemony. This hegemony is manifest by the presence of Soviet (i.e. foreign) troops in East Europe and by the existence of Soviet functionaries who control various East European governments. In addition, the political situation in East Europe evolved fairly suddenly and not so long ago (late 1940s). Therefore,

there are many people still living who can recall alternative social institutions and life styles. If there is danger of explosion in the Soviet Union it probably lies with the same origins as in East Europe, i.e. nationalism. The Soviet Union is a composite of many nationalities. They form a majority over the Russian people.

³⁴ See Schwartz, "Elusive 'New Soviet Man,'" p. 40.

³⁵ "Educating Students to be Ideologically Reliable," Radio Liberty Dispatch, January 1, 1973.

³⁶ Hedrick Smith, "Soviets Troubled by Teen Age Crime," New York Times, February 13, 1972, p. 9.

³⁷ See Walter D. Connor, "Dissent in a Complex Society: The Soviet Case," Problems of Communism, March-April, 1973, vol. XXII.

³⁸ Nikolai Galay, "Young Soviet Intellectuals and the Armed Forces," Youth in Peril, Munich, Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R., July 1962, Series I, #66, p. 55.

³⁹ Kaseof, Soviet Youth Program, p. 61.

⁴⁰ Werth, "Komsomol Check-up."

⁴¹ Kaseof, Soviet Youth Program, p. 60.

⁴² The Communists express their line to their populace often through slogans. Changes in these carefully worded dictums often prove indicative of basic policy changes. Dueval believes that the Soviets offer the slogans as a "peep" inside Soviet intentions. He cites the fact that the slogans are released in the Sunday news, thus achieving the widest readership of these "ideologically enshrined succinct statements of basic Soviet foreign and domestic policy aims." Christian Dueval, "October slogans of 1972 and 1973 Compared," Radio Liberty Dispatch, October 17, 1973, p. 1. However, no attempt is made to editorialize, analyse or point out new features in the slogans. It is typical of the Communists to save their bridges behind them so that they can quickly jump to new "correct lines" without being embarrassed by concrete contradictions.

⁴³ Christian Dueval, "Comparison of October Slogans 1971-1972," Radio Liberty Dispatch, October 18, 1972.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Pravda, April 11, 1976, p. 1 as reported in Current Digest, May 7, 1976, LIVII.

⁴⁶ Christian Dueval, "The May Day Slogans of 1975," Radio Liberty Dispatch, April 26, 1975.

⁴⁷ Pravda, March 24, 1975 as reported in Current Digest, April 1, 1975, LIVII.

⁴⁸ See V. F. Lebedenskii, "The Role of Komsomol and Young Pioneer Organizations in Instilling Ideological Steadfastness, A Sense of Civic Duty and Conscious Discipline in Schoolchildren," Soviet Education, March 1975, pp. 22-27, 32-36, 45-47. See also W. W. Brainerd, ed., "Education in the Soviet Union: Change Within Continuity," School and Society, January 1972, pp. 29-33, April 1972, pp. 241-270; "Current Policies and Priorities in Soviet Education: Symposium," Soviet Education, January 1974, pp. 3-98; "Moral Education of Soviet Schoolchildren: Symposium," Soviet Education, November 1974, pp. 3-112 and J. T. Zepper, "Recent and Contemporary Soviet Educational Thought," School and Society, January 1972, pp. 40-43.

⁴⁹ Kassof, Soviet Youth Program, p. 5.

⁵⁰ The word "Russian" is not casually used here or elsewhere as a synonym for a citizen of the Soviet Union. Ethnically identifiable "Russians" form a huge group within the Soviet multinational union. They enjoy a privileged position in their society bordering on "racism." However, they do not comprise a numerical majority over non-Russians. Focus in this essay remains on "Russian" characteristics due to their cultural sway and to avoid endless digressions concerning various national responses to the indoctrination program.

produced items displayed in store windows are only for export, or for sale to a privileged few. "Detente's Meaning to the Russians: A Better Life," U.S. News & World Report, July 8, 1974, p. 17.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ The Soviet Union has not jammed the Voice of America since 1973. The VOA, however, concerns itself basically with "selling the United States" and is not designed as a "substitute free press" for Soviet listeners which would deal more with internal Soviet or Communist affairs such as do Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (both of which remained jammed by the Soviets). James Keogh, "How a Troubled America Puts Best Foot Forward Abroad," U.S. News & World Report, September 30, 1974, p. 39. The Soviet Union had spent \$150 million a year just to jam the VOA. Jamming is very expensive and the decision to continue jamming numerous other radio sources today attests to Soviet fears of outside information. "Jamming Radio," New York Times, November 14, 1970, p. 6. Soviet expenditures for jamming all sources in 1972 was estimated at \$300 million.

Censorship in general is a big business in the Soviet Union. The system includes a complete state monopoly over all physical means of communication, a monopoly which has been extended and guarded throughout the 55-year history of the Soviet state. It also includes a vast bureaucracy of officials, controlled and administered in centralized fashion by the top party and government organs. It insures that information and ideas shall not be disseminated to the people by any media without prior approval by the appropriate authorities.

The aim of Soviet censorship is not only preventive, but also ideologically activist; that is to say, it strives to insure that its citizens see all events and issues only in the way predetermined by officials of the Central Committee to which the whole censorship system is subordinate. The late Soviet literary critic Arkadi Belinkov said in London in January 1970: "Censorship, as practiced in the Soviet Union, is a new phenomenon in the history of thought control. Before it emerged, dictatorial societies, from antiquity had been concerned merely to repress heretical opinions, whereas the Soviet Communist Party has introduced a system so thorough that it not only censors a writer but dictates what he should say." "Impediments to the Free Flow of Information and Ideas to and inside the Soviet Union," Radio Liberty Dispatch, November 20, 1972.

¹¹ Jan Prazky, "The Dialectics of Detente," World Marxist Review, vol. 17 # 9, September 1974, p. 129.

¹² "Current Tasks of Ideological Work," Pravda, editorial July 8, 1972, p. 5.

¹³ Jean Riollet, "Peaceful Coexistence & Australian Kangaroos," Radio Liberty Dispatch, September 26, 1973.

¹⁴ Christian Dueval, "Two More C.P.S.U. Officials Corroborate Sakharov's Warning on Detente," Radio Liberty Dispatch, September 12, 1973, p. 3. Since the terms "peaceful coexistence" and "detente" in their Soviet connotation signify on the one hand an absence of war and on the other hand an intensification of the struggle between competing systems by means

short of war, "it follows that the period after the conclusion of a treaty or arrangement on European security [for example] is likely to be one in which opportunities for subversion of Western societies will be exploited fully by the Soviet Union." Brian Crozier, ed., The Peace-time Strategy of the Soviet Union, Institute for the Study of Conflict, February-March, 1973, p. 65.

¹⁵ Goure, Military Indoctrination, p. v.

¹⁶ Laird, "Let's Not Fool Ourselves," pp. 58-59.

¹⁷ Goure, Military Indoctrination, p. 73.

¹⁸ "Komsomol Congress," New York Times, May 31, 1970, Section 4, p. 6.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Bronfenbrenner, Two Worlds, pp. 77 & 81.

²¹ Noah, "Communist Schooling," p. 73.

²² See Cyril E. Black & Thomas P. Thornton, eds., Communism and Revolution: The Strategic Uses of Political Violence, Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1971, p. 410 and Constantine Olgiv, "Soviet Philosophy in the International Arena: Preparations in the U.S.S.R. for the XVth World Congress of Philosophy," Radio Liberty Dispatch, August 1973, p. 49.

²³ "The Brezhnev Mystery - Who Will Run Russia?" U.S. News & World Report, February 10, 1975, p. 35.

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